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THE OTHER PATENT AGENCY: CONGRESSIONAL
REGULATION OF THE ITC
Sapna Kumar*
ABSTRACT
The United States International Trade Commission has recently
experienced a dramatic increase in patent infringement investigations
under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In fact, the number of patent
enforcement actions submitted to the ITC has nearly doubled in the last
five years. Patent holders are selecting this forum because of its speedy
proceedings and its ability to award broad exclusion orders. This rise in
ITC patent litigation, however, has revealed weaknesses in the structure
of § 337. In broadening the provision to facilitate the enforcement of
patent rights, Congress failed to consider the impact of this change on
technological innovation and on the coherence of the patent system. In
particular, Congress did not clarify the relationship between § 337 and
the Patent Act, thereby jeopardizing the uniformity of the patent system.
Nor did it consider the effect that patent-related exclusion orders would
have on innovation and on strategic behavior. This Article recommends
that Congress harmonize ITC patent law with the Patent Act and related
federal precedent, or alternatively, abolish § 337.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation serves as the foundation of the patent
system. The government grants inventors a limited monopoly right, in
the form of a patent, to foster innovation. Doing so supports the U.S.
economy and improves the public’s quality of life.1 Charged by Article
1, § 8 of the Constitution with promoting “the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,”2 Congress bears the burden of regulating patent law.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot “enlarge the patent
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social
benefit gained thereby,” as these factors “are inherent requisites in a
patent system.”3 “This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and
it may not be ignored.”4
Much attention has been paid to how Congress has adhered to—or
failed to adhere to—this standard in regulating patents. Commentators
have debated how to promote innovation through reform of the Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.5 Others have focused on the relationship
between innovation and Congress’s regulation of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office.6
1. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at
http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/misc/FTCreport.pdf (“Innovation
benefits consumers through the development of new and improved goods, services, and
processes. An economy’s capacity for invention and innovation helps drive its economic growth
and the degree to which standards of living increase. Technological breakthroughs . . . illustrate
the power of innovation to increase prosperity and improve the quality of our lives.” (footnote
omitted)); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 218; Duke Sci., Tech. &
Innovation Paper No. 29, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259850 (“Both theory
and empirics support the primacy of technological innovation in securing long-term economic
growth and, ultimately, human welfare.”); Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Presentation at the 11th Annual Symposium on Antitrust:
Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation 9 (Oct. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/227291.pdf (“In other words, improvements in
technology—new ways of producing, rather than just old methods done more intensely—create
the vast majority of improvement in real societal wealth.”). See generally COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Benn Steil et al. eds.,
2002) (analyzing the relationship between technological innovation and economic
performance).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT
REFORM: INNOVATION ISSUES (2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32996_2005
0715.pdf; James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure 235–60 (Princeton U. Press 2008).
6. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
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This debate has overlooked how Congress’s regulation of the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) through § 337 of the Tariff Act
of 19307 affects the patent system and whether § 337 promotes the goals
of Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution. The ITC has become a popular
forum for enforcing patents, with the number of actions increasing by
nearly 80% since 2003.8 Patent holders utilize the ITC because of the
availability of powerful exclusion orders, which block the importation
of infringing products.9 Although § 337 was not historically used for
enforcing intellectual property (IP) rights, in recent years, more than
94% of all § 337 investigations have involved a patent infringement
allegation.10
Section 337 became particularly useful for patent enforcement after
Congress passed the Omnibus Trade And Competitiveness Act of 1988,
which dropped several requirements that could prevent patent holders
from using the ITC.11 Congress’s motivation for the amendments was to
protect domestic IP holders from infringement by foreign companies.
But inadvertently, Congress crippled the ITC’s ability to shield
domestic companies by allowing foreign companies with few U.S. ties
to litigate there and by facilitating litigation against domestic companies
that import goods. More broadly, Congress did not consider the effect
that the rapid globalization of trade and manufacturing would have on
promoting U.S. innovation through the Tariff Act. The present
arrangement has led to two major problems.
First, in amending § 337, Congress created a rift between ITC and
federal court patent law. Part of this problem arises from Congress’s
failure to make the Patent Act binding on the ITC. In Kinik Co. v.
International Trade Commission,12 for example, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the ITC’s decision that defenses under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)13 do

Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2003).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). Because the unfair practices provision of the Tariff Act was
once codified at 19 U.S.C. § 337, it is commonly referred to as “§ 337.”
8. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2007, at 67 (2007) [hereinafter ITC PERFORMANCE REPORT], available at
http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/about_itc/USITC_PAR_2007.pdf.
9. See ITC Trial Lawyers Association, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Section
337, http://www.itctla.org/faq.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
10. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN TRADE 2007: OPERATION OF THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS P ROGRAM 59 TH REPORT 2-10 (2008), available at http://www.usitc.gov/public
ations/pub4026.pdf (noting 100% of new cases in 2007 included allegations of patent
infringement); U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 14 (2006)
(noting 94.3% of all active cases in the 2006 fiscal year involved patent allegations, while the
remainder of cases involved trademark, trade dress, or dilution claims).
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. 362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
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not apply to ITC proceedings involving § 337.14 ITC decisions,
moreover, do not have collateral estoppel effect on federal court
decisions,15 leading to inconsistent judgments. Such decisions cause
incoherence in patent law and ultimately threaten innovation.
Second, in interpreting its organic statute, the ITC makes patent
policy that is sometimes in tension with the purpose of the patent
system. In particular, the ITC hinders innovation and harms the public
welfare by frequently granting exclusion orders. The ITC is not bound
by the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,16
which limits the ability of district courts to grant injunctions. The FTC’s
overuse of injunctive relief has led to decisions that harm domestic
companies and threaten innovation.
This Article proposes that Congress amend § 337 to harmonize ITC
patent law with the Patent Act, in order to promote innovation and
ensure the coherency of the patent system. Alternatively, it suggests that
Congress abolish § 337. Part II provides an overview of the ITC. Part
III discusses how Congress created the ITC to secure protectionist
support for trade liberalization. It then discusses how Congress failed to
consider the implication of its actions on the patent system. Part IV
looks at the evolution of § 337 into a patent enforcement statute under
the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988. It examines the rationale for the
expansion of § 337 and discusses the changes that Congress made.
Parts V and VI discuss problems that have emerged from Congress’s
transformation of § 337 to a patent enforcement statute. Part V
discusses how ITC and federal court patent law are diverging in the area
of process patents and applicable defenses. It further discusses how ITC
decisions do not have preclusive effect on subsequent federal court
proceedings and how this has led to forum shopping and other strategic
behavior by patent holders. It suggests that Congress bind the ITC to the
Patent Act and grant collateral estoppel effect to ITC proceedings.
Part VI highlights the problems caused by the ITC’s liberal use of
exclusion orders. It offers suggestions to Congress on how to amend
§ 337 to reduce the issuance of harmful orders. Finally, Part VI argues
that Congress needs to take a uniform approach to promoting innovation
in the patent system. To the extent that this is not feasible, Part VI
suggests that Congress abolish § 337 and bring exclusion orders under
the Patent Act.
14. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1362–63. The holding of the case does not turn on the court’s
analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). Nevertheless, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) raised the
issue of whether that portion of the opinion was good law, and flagged it for future
consideration. See Order No. 22, In re Sucralose, Sweeteners Containing Sucralose, & Related
Intermediate Compounds Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-604, 2007 WL 2900049 (Oct. 1,
2007).
15. See infra Part VI.B.
16. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see infra Part VI.
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II. PATENT DECISIONS IN THE ITC VS. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
Patent litigation in the ITC differs significantly from litigation in
federal court. A staff attorney is assigned to each investigation to
represent the public interest and acts as a third-party litigant.17 An
Administrative Law Judge decides the outcome of the investigation,
which is then reviewed by six ITC commissioners, and jury trials are
not available.18 Most importantly, the ITC can issue a unique form of
injunctive relief called an exclusion order, which blocks goods that
infringe the patent at issue from entering the country.19
To illustrate how ITC litigation works, suppose U.S.-based
GoodCorp owns a patent on widgets. Further suppose that competitor
BadCorp, also in the U.S., is selling infringing widgets. BadCorp does
not make these widgets, but rather, buys them from an Indian
manufacturer ForeignCorp and imports them into the U.S. GoodCorp
decides to litigate against BadCorp and ForeignCorp in the ITC.
A. Initial Requirements
1. Domestic Industry Requirement
To litigate in the ITC, GoodCorp must show that “an industry in the
United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent, . . . exists
or is in the process of being established.”20 The ITC divides this
requirement into two prongs, the technical prong and economic prong.21
To meet the technical prong, GoodCorp must show that it or its
licensees “practices at least one claim of the asserted patents[.]”22 To
meet the economic prong, GoodCorp must show that it engages in
domestic activities, with respect to the patent or patented article, that
involve: “(A) significant investment in plant and equipment; (B)
significant employment of labor or capital; or (C) substantial investment
in [the patent’s] exploitation, including engineering, research and
development, or licensing.”23 The economic prong’s purpose is “to
assure that domestic production-related activities, as opposed to those of
17. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2004) [hereinafter ITC FAQ], available at http://www.usitc.gov/trade_r
emedy/int_prop/pub3708.pdf. The staff attorney’s role illustrates that a § 337 proceeding “is not
purely private litigation ‘between the parties’ but rather is an ‘investigation’ by the
Government.” Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
18. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 18–21; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
19. ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 3.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2).
21. In re Male Prophylactic Devices, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-546, 2007 ITC LEXIS 860,
at *60 (Aug. 1, 2007).
22. Id.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3).
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a mere importer, are protected by the statute.”24 Determination of
whether the prong has been met is highly subjective.25
2. Jurisdiction
The ITC does not need personal jurisdiction over BadCorp and
ForeignCorp. Instead, the ITC has in rem jurisdiction over the allegedly
infringing widgets.26 This provision allows GoodCorp to obtain relief
from foreign infringers that are potentially beyond the reach of U.S.
courts, such as ForeignCorp.27 Although the “defendant” is the
infringing widgets, foreign manufacturers and importers are served with
a copy of the complaint and given an opportunity to participate in the
proceeding.28 These parties may raise any equitable or legal defense,
such as patent invalidity.29 The ITC also has nationwide jurisdiction to
conduct investigations, including nationwide service of process for
subpoena enforcement actions.30 GoodCorp can take advantage of this
power if it wants to compel out-of-district third party witnesses to
testify at trial.31

24. Male Prophylactic Devices, 2007 ITC LEXIS 860, at *61 (citing In re Products with
Gremlins Character Depictions, USITC Pub. 1815, Inv. No. 337-TA-201, at 6 (Mar. 1986)).
25. See id. at *62 (“The Commission’s determination on the economic prong is not made
according to any rigid formula—there is no mathematical threshold test. Instead, the
determination is made by ‘an examination of the facts in each investigation, the article of
commerce, and the realities of the marketplace.’” (quoting In re Double-Sided Floppy Disk
Drives and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1860, Inv. No. 337-TA-215, at 17 (May 1986))).
26. See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981)
(“An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties. . . . The Tariff Act of 1930 . . . [was]
intended to provide an adequate remedy for domestic industries against unfair methods of
competition and unfair acts instigated by foreign concerns operating beyond the in personam
jurisdiction of domestic courts.”); Robert G. Krupka et al., Section 337 and the GATT: The
Problem or the Solution?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 779, 789 (1993). Note, however, that in personam
jurisdiction can be established by personal appearance, and may need to be established for the
agency to issue a cease and desist order to enforce a § 337 violation. DONALD KNOX DUVALL,
FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 337 OF THE
TARIFF ACT OF 1930, at 63, 71–107 (Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., ed. 1991) (1992).
27. See sources cited, supra note 26.
28. Walter J. Blenko, When Does Patent Infringement Become Unfair Competition?,
JOM, Oct. 1990, at 55, 55, available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters9010.html.
29. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006). Note, however, that the ITC has held that defenses
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) are not available in § 337 proceedings. See Part V.
30. See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(noting that the ITC “may require the ‘attendance of witnesses and the production of such
documentary evidence . . . from any place in the United States at any designated place of
hearing’” (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1333(b))).
31. See Bruce Barker & Steward Brown, Why You Should Consider the ITC Option,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Apr. 2003, at 39, 41.
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B. Structure of Proceedings & Remedies
After GoodCorp files a complaint, the ITC will decide if action is
merited.32 If it chooses to proceed, it will open an investigation.33 The
investigation is then referred to one of six ALJs for an evidentiary
hearing.34 ALJs have a reputation for being more experienced with
patent law matters compared to most district court judges, given the
high volume of patent cases that ALJs hear.35 At this time, the ITC’s
Office of Unfair Import Investigations assigns a staff attorney to
represent the public interest and serve as a party in the investigation.36
This attorney is an active participant in the proceedings and can
influence the outcome of the case.37
1. Speed of Proceedings
ITC proceedings move quickly. The ALJ will set a short discovery
period, often less than five months.38 ITC discovery is broad, as there
are few limitations on interrogatories, foreign discovery, and the scope
of discovery.39 Typically after six or seven months, the ALJ will hold a
formal evidentiary hearing, in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act.40 Based on the hearing, the ALJ will issue an Initial
Determination (ID) on GoodCorp’s case, which is certified to the ITC
with the evidentiary record.41

32. For details on filing an ITC complaint, see 19 C.F.R. § 210.12 (2008); Robert G.
Krupka, International Trade Commission Patent Litigation: A Unique Experience, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1992, at 475, 480 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property,
Course Handbook Series No. G4-3892, 1992).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1).
34. ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 2. Note that the ITC can hire more than six ALJs, if its
budget allows. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3,
6, available at http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/about_itc/documents/budget_2010.pdf. For
more information on ALJs, see DUVALL, supra note 26, at 158–66; Hon. Carl C. Charneski, The
Role of the Office of Administrative Law Judges Within the United States International Trade
Commission, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 216 (2009).
35. Barker & Brown, supra note 31, at 40.
36. ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 2.
37. See Russell E. Levine, The Benefits of Using the ITC, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Sept.
2004, at 25, 27.
38. DUVALL, supra note 26, at 250–51.
39. See id.; Lyle Vander Schaaf, ITC Cases Are on the Rise, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 6, 2004, at
S1.
40. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2006); ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 18 (“While the length
and timing of hearings varies from case to case, in an investigation scheduled to be completed
within twelve months, for example, the evidentiary hearing often occurs about six or seven
months after institution of the investigation.”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (detailing the
requirement of formality under the Administrative Procedure Act).
41. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 2.
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The decision then automatically goes up to the ITC’s six-member
Commission, who have the option to decline review of the ID (allowing
it to become final), review and adopt it, modify it, or reverse it.42 The
Commission’s order goes into effect after sixty days, except in the rare
event that the President disapproves of it on policy grounds under
§ 337(j).43 If GoodCorp’s proceeding—from start to finish—takes the
average amount of time, it will conclude in just under seventeen
months,44 which is faster then some so-called “rocket docket” district
courts.45
2. Remedies
A unique feature of § 337 litigation is the availability of exclusion
orders. Cash damages are not available in the ITC.46 Rather, if
GoodCorp prevails, the Commission will generally enter a limited or
general exclusion order.47 Limited exclusion orders instruct the U.S.
42. See id. at 21. The commissioners are nominated by the president and confirmed by the
Senate. James M. De Vault, Congressional Dominance and the International Trade
Commission, 110 PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 4 (2002). This reduces the likelihood that free trade or
protectionist extremists are confirmed. Id. The commissioners serve non-renewable terms of
nine years, unless appointed to fill an unexpired term. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INSPECTION REPORT NO. OIG-IR-01-02, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION’S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1972,
at 1 (2002). No more than three commissioners may be members of the same political party. Id.
43. Presidents have overturned five ITC decisions since the agency was created in 1974,
and have not done so since the mid-1980s. See Press Release, Broadcom Corp., Broadcom
Urges Administration to Let ITC Patent Action Stand (July 5, 2007), available at
http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=1023034. In explaining why the Bush
administration declined to overturn the ITC’s decision in In re Baseband Processor Chips and
Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products
Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007
ITC LEXIS 621 (June 19, 2007), rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab
noted: “I am continuing the practice of successive Administrations of exercising section 337
review authority with restraint, reserving for extraordinary cases the power to disapprove the
findings and orders of the USITC.” Press Release, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Schwab Decision on the ITC Investigation of Certain Processor Chips (Aug. 6,
2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2007/August/Schwa
b_Decision_on_the_ITC_Investigation_of_Certain_Processor_Chips.html.
44. See ITC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 70 (noting that from the 2003–2006
fiscal years, the average time for completion of a § 337 investigation was fifteen months, rising
to 16.6 months during the 2007 fiscal year).
45. “Rocket dockets” refer to district courts—or occasionally, to particular district court
judges—that have adopted procedural practices that allow patent cases to be litigated quickly.
See Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation,
85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 227 (1997). The Eastern District of Texas, which is a well-known rocket
docket, takes 17.7 months, on average, to get a case to trial. See Sacha Pfeiffer, Blueprint for
Boston: Make it a Patent-Fight Arena, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2007, at C1.
46. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22.
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006); ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22–23.
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Customs and Border Protection (Customs) to exclude from entry all
articles that are covered by the patent at issue and that originate from a
named respondent in the investigation.48 General exclusion orders, in
contrast, direct Customs “to exclude all infringing articles, without
regard to source.”49 Preliminary injunctions are also available, though
requests for the injunctions are relatively uncommon, given the speed of
ITC litigation.50
The ITC, in theory, must consider policy implications of an
exclusion order before issuing one. The ITC can decline to issue an
exclusion order, or can narrow it, if, “after considering the effect of
such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive
conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States
consumers, [the ITC] finds that such articles should not be excluded
from entry” or such an order should not be issued.51 In practice,
however, policy considerations do little to mitigate the harsh effects of
exclusion orders.52
At its discretion, the ITC may issue a cease-and-desist order in
addition to or in place of an exclusion order.53 Such orders issue against
specific respondents and prevent sale of “commercially significant”
domestic inventories of infringing goods.54 For respondents without
domestic inventory, exclusion orders are generally used.55
C. Dual Litigation and Conflicting Judgments
When a party litigates a patent infringement dispute in the ITC, it
does not lose the right to litigate in federal court. Thus, GoodCorp can
pursue an ITC action in addition to a district court action56 and can even
48. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22. See generally, Merritt R. Blakeslee, PostLitigation Enforcement of Remedial Orders Issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission
in Section 337 Investigations, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 248 (2009).
49. ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22; see Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
50. Steven E. Adkins & June E. Cohan, Not Mere Litigation: Remedies Available for IP
Infringement at the International Trade Commission, COMP. & INTERNET LAWYER, May 2005, at
16, 18.
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
52. See infra Part VI.A.1.
53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386
F.3d 1095, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
54. See Fuji Photo Film, 386 F.3d at 1107; In re Integrated Repeaters, Switches, and
Transceivers, USITC Pub. 3547, Inv. No. 337-TA-435, 2002 ITC LEXIS 615, at *56 (Oct.
2002).
55. FujiPhoto Film, 386 F.3d at 1107.
56. It is also possible to have “parallel district court and [ITC] patent infringement actions
and [Patent and Trademark Office] interferences.” Charles L. Goltz, Parallel District Court and
ITC Infringement Actions and PTO Interferences, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 607,
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receive conflicting judgments.57 The availability of dual litigation is
well established by the courts.58 In 1994, Congress enacted a provision
stating that at the request of any party in a § 337 ITC proceeding, “the
district court shall stay, until the determination of the Commission
becomes final, proceedings in the civil action with respect to any claim
that involves the same issues involved in the proceeding before the
Commission . . . .”59
Dual litigation remains highly controversial.60 As one district court
noted, “by allowing parallel proceedings and indeed almost encouraging
them, Congress has created the real possibility of inconsistent results
between ITC and district court proceedings.”61 The court’s concern is
supported by empirical evidence. Of the twenty-two parallel cases from
1972 to 2006, nine of them had conflicting decisions.62 This number
will likely rise, given the significant increase in § 337 investigations63
and the fact that 65% of investigations have a district court

608 (2001).
57. For example, the ITC found that U.S. Philips Corporation’s six patents pertaining to
recordable compact discs were unenforceable due to patent misuse, but a year later, a district
court held that the same six patents were valid and infringed. Compare In re Recordable
Compact Discs and Rewritable Compact Discs, USITC Pub. 3686, Inv. No. 337-TA-474, 2004
WL 1435791 (Mar. 2004), with U.S. Philips Corp. v. Princo Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 168, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); vacated, 173 Fed. App’x 832 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
58. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see
also Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
9, 2001) (“[S]tatutory provisions appear to indicate that ITC proceedings may proceed
simultaneously with district court proceedings . . . .”).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (2006). In 1989, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) panel ruled that § 337 violated national treatment provisions in Article III, section 4 of
GATT. See United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report by the Panel Adopted
on 7 November 1989 (L/6439), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents 345, 396 (36th Supp. 1990); James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual
Property Rights and Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable
Aids Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727, 767 (2001). This led Congress to
amend § 337 in 1994 under the Uruguay Round, in an attempt to bring the U.S. into compliance
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See Joel W. Rodgers & Joseph P. Whitlock,
Is Section 337 Consistent with the GATT and the TRIPS Agreement?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
459, 478–81 (2002).
60. Some commentators have suggested stripping the ITC of jurisdiction for cases where
a federal court would have jurisdiction. See Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in
Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 457, 487 (2008).
61. Kaisha, 2001 WL 1388911, at *2.
62. Hahn & Singer, supra note 60, at 480–81.
63. A Record Number of Section 337 Cases Filed at the ITC, as the Supreme Court’s eBay
Decision Makes Section 337 an Even More Attractive Alternative Than Ever to District Court
Litigation, INTELL. PROP. LITIG. ALERT (Bingham McCutchen, L.L.P.), July 5, 2006, at 1,
available at http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=2830.
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counterpart.64 Conflicting decisions result from the fact that ITC
decisions are not entitled to preclusive effect in federal court.65
III. THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN ITC
Congress created the ITC to gain protectionist support for trade
reform. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress made several
attempts to pass trade legislation to address problems with the U.S.
economy. It was difficult for Congress to secure reform because of a
split between free trade supporters and protectionists. Congress
overcame the deadlock by creating the ITC as part of the Trade Reform
Act of 1974.66 Under this Act, Congress liberalized trade in an attempt
to alleviate looming economic crisis.67 As a compromise, Congress also
replaced the U.S. Tariff Commission, which only had advisory power,
with the ITC. The ITC received expanded powers under § 337 to
remedy acts of unfair competition, including patent infringement.
Despite creating a new remedy for patent infringement, Congress
gave little consideration to how § 337 would affect patent law. It did not
require the ITC to abide by the Patent Act, an omission that would later
cause inconsistency between patent litigation in the ITC versus in
federal court. More importantly, the ITC did not consider the effect that
the protectionist agency could have on technological innovation.
A. The Tariff Commission and the Move Toward Free Trade
The United States Tariff Commission was created in 191668 and has
been described as “a relic of an era when tariff treaties did not exist.”69
The early Tariff Commission had three primary functions: (1) to help
Congress set tariff rates by providing pertinent information, (2) to make
64. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 70 (2008) (studying § 337
cases initiated between January 1995 and June 2007).
65. See infra Part V.B.
66. See S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 5 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7187
(“The Trade Reform Act of 1974, which the Committee on Finance now reports to the Senate
with amendments, coincides with a serious crisis in the domestic and world economies. Twenty
months have passed since former President Nixon requested the Congress to provide the
Executive with authority to negotiate ‘a more open and equitable trading world.’ Events during
the past year have severely strained the world’s economy, underscoring the need to find
cooperative solutions to common domestic and international economic problems.”).
67. See id.; J. Kennerly Davis, Jr., Comment, The Trade Reform Act of 1973, 15 HARV.
INT’L. L.J. 126, 126 (1974) (“That policy currently is at its most critical juncture in over 25
years due to an extended series of trade and payments deficits, repeated currency crises, and a
significant devaluation of the dollar.”).
68. Revenue Act, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 795, 795 (1916).
69. ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL
PROPOSALS 61 (1971).
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recommendations to Congress upon request, and (3) to provide
information to help the President administer the tariff laws.70 The Tariff
Act of 1930—more commonly known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff—
gave the agency investigative powers.71 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff is
best known for raising U.S. tariffs to historically high levels, which
some scholars believe exacerbated the severity of the Great
Depression.72
The government’s effort to liberalize trade began, in earnest, in the
1960s, when President Kennedy proposed a new trade agreement to
“meet the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world
economy.”73 Congress responded with The Trade Expansion Act of
1962,74 which provided a significant tariff reduction. The Act’s purpose
was to stimulate economic growth, enlarge foreign markets for U.S.
goods, and to strengthen relations with other countries through free
trade.75 The Act gave the President broad authority to negotiate tariff
reductions of as much as 50%.76 Furthermore, it authorized U.S.
participation in the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.77
Despite this initial shift toward free trade, protectionists would soon
make policy inroads. In the mid to late 1960s, the U.S. payment deficit
worsened, paving the way for trade restrictions.78 In 1967, Congress let
70. Id.
71. Tariff Act, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 696, 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1330) (“To assist the President in making any decisions under this section the commission is
hereby authorized to investigate any alleged violation hereof on complaint under oath or upon
its initiative.”).
72. See Robert E. Hudac, “Circumventing” Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade
Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 311, 313 (1993) (discussing how the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff led to a massive increase in tariffs, leading to a “sharp contraction of world trade that
contributed substantially to the length and depth of [the Great Depression]”).
73. President’s Special Message to Congress on Foreign Trade Policy, 2 PUB. PAPERS 68
(Jan. 25, 1962).
74. Trade Expansion Act, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 102, 76 Stat. 872, 872. (1962).
75. The Statement of Purpose for the Act was
(1) to stimulate the economic growth of the United States and maintain and
enlarge foreign markets for the products of United States agriculture, industry,
mining, and commerce; (2) to strengthen economic relations with foreign
countries through the development of open and nondiscriminatory trading in
the free world; and (3) to prevent Communist economic penetration.
Id.
76. Id. § 201(b), 76 Stat. at 872; EDWARD G. HINKELMAN, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: HANDBOOK OF THE GLOBAL TRADE COMMUNITY 170 (6th ed. 2005).
77. HINKELMAN, supra note 76, at 170.
78. THOMAS W. ZEILER, AMERICAN TRADE AND POWER IN THE 1960S, at 241 (1992)
(“Augmented by the falling trade surplus, domestic inflation, and an overvalued dollar, the
American payments deficit eventually led to more drastic—and trade-restrictive—measures by
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the President’s power to negotiate tariff reductions expire.79 Labor
unions and other domestic industries began calling for the establishment
of trade quotas.80 The response from Congress was the unsuccessful
Trade Act of 1970,81 in which Congress sought to sharply reduce
imports and was derided by commentators and economists.82 The
Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972 followed,83 which was
designed “to ‘discourage American business investment abroad and [to]
limit the flow of imports into this country.’”84 This bill also failed.
The economy continued to sour. In 1970, unemployment hit 6.1%
and the country entered a recession.85 The last remnants of fixed
exchange rate structure between the dollar and gold collapsed in 1971,
ending the gold standard.86 The OPEC oil embargo followed a year
later. President Nixon responded with a series of protectionist measures,
including freezing wages and prices87 and imposing a 10% surcharge on
imports.88 Trade reform was desperately needed, which meant getting
both free trade supporters and protectionists to agree on one course of
action.
B. The Trade Act of 1974 and the Birth of the ITC
The Trade Act of 197489 emerged from a Nixon administration
proposal to boost the economy by liberalizing trade and to provide the
President with unprecedented power in U.S. trade policy.90 However,
President Nixon emphasized that “while trade should be more open, it
the administration of Richard M. Nixon . . . .”).
79. See Kazimierz Grzybowski et al., Towards Integrated Management of International
Trade—The U.S. Trade Act of 1974, 26 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 283, 284 (1977).
80. See EDWARD S. KAPLAN, AMERICAN TRADE POLICY, 1923–1995, at 89 (1996); John B.
Rehm, Proposed Trade Act of 1970: What Direction U.S. Foreign Trade Policy?, 2 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 289, 290 (1971).
81. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong. (1970).
82. See, e.g., Rehm, supra note 80, at 320 (“On balance, it is a regressive and protectionist
measure that disregards international obligations as much as sound economics.”); Jerry L.
Siegel, Note, The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade
Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1418, 1419 (1971) (stating that the bill, if enacted, “would represent a
retreat from free trade”); Trade: The Black Comedy That Could Come True, TIME, Nov. 23,
1970, at 97, 97 (arguing that the bill “would turn the clock back 35 years, to the days before the
nation began leading a highly beneficial world movement toward freer trade”).
83. Gryzbowski et al., supra note 79, at 287.
84. See id. (citing 117 CONG. REC. 33584 (1971) (statement of Senator Hartke)).
85. Thad W. Mirer, The Distributional Impact of the 1970 Recession, 55 REV. OF ECON. &
STAT. 214, 214 (1973).
86. Stephen P. Magee, Currency Contracts, Pass-through, and Devaluation, in 1
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 303, 303 (1973).
87. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727, 15,727 (Aug. 17, 1971).
88. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724, 15,724 (1971).
89. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
90. See H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see also KAPLAN, supra note 80, at 89.
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should also be more fair.”91 Increasing fairness included expanding
protection against unfair competition.92 By balancing free trade with
broad protectionist measures against unfair competition, President
Nixon found a way to reconcile the free trade and protectionist factions
in Congress.
The bills that entered the House and Senate were the subject of
fierce debate. Companies that depended on trade—such as IBM, Union
Carbide, and Exxon—argued in favor of trade liberalization.93 Unions
led the opposition.94 Notably absent from the debate was a discussion of
patent or other IP issues. Buried within thousands pages of House and
Senate testimony was the statement of just one registered patent
attorney and his associate.95 There were no other IP attorneys or related
interest groups involved with the debate and only limited discussion of
patents by other parties.96

91. President’s Special Message to Congress Proposing Trade Reform Legislation, 5 PUB.
PAPERS 258, 261 (Apr. 10, 1973).
92. Id. at 265 (“To cope with unfair competitive practices in our own markets, [the]
proposed legislation would . . . amend the current statute concerning patent infringement by
subjecting cases involving imports to judicial proceedings similar to those which involve
domestic infringement . . . .”).
93. See The Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearing on H.R. 6767 Before the H. Comm. on
Ways & Means, 93d Cong. 691–92 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 House Hearings] (statement of
Gilbert E. Jones, Chairman of the Board, IBM World Trade Corp.) (arguing that companies
need to be able to take advantage of foreign technological advances); id. at 2897, 2899
(statement of Fred C. Kroft, Jr., President, Ferroalloys Division, Union Carbide Corp.)
(supporting the “permanent [] suspension of duty on [imports of] manganese ore”); id. at 4503–
04 (statement of Emilio G. Collado, Executive Vice President, Exxon Corp.) (“Growth in U.S.
exports will be required to help defray the growing balance-of-payments costs of oil imports,
and further multilateral trade liberalization would help to provide growing export
opportunities.”).
94. See The Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearing on H.R. 10710 Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 93d Cong. 1329–31 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Senate Hearings] (statement of I.W. Abel,
President, United Steelworkers of America) (opposing the Senate bill); id. at 1687 (statement of
George Collins, Assistant to the President, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers) (opposing the Senate bill).
95. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 93, at 1588–90 (joint statement of Harvey Kaye &
Paul Plaia, Jr., Attorneys) (suggesting amendments to the bill from the perspective of patent
attorneys).
96. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 93, at 363–64 (statement of Ambassador
William D. Eberele, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, accompanied by
Ambassador William R. Pearce, Deputy Special Representative & John H. Jackson, General
Counsel) (arguing all patent infringement involving foreign wrongdoing should be permitted in
the ITC); id. at 500–01 (statement of Honorable Fredrick B. Dent, Secretary of Commerce)
(observing that § 337 “ha[d] been amended to provide patent owners with a simpler, quicker,
and more effective remedy against infringing imports”); id. at 781 (statement of Kurt Orban,
President, American Importers Association, Inc.) (“Section 337 should be repealed, permitting
the regular patent laws to function in this area.”).
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The final bill, which passed in January 1975, reflected the
compromise made between free trade supporters and protectionists. To
protect domestic industry from unfair practices, Congress remade the
Tariff Commission into the more independent ITC and granted it new
powers.97 The most important of these powers was the ability to make
final decisions on issuing exclusion orders, reversible only by the
president for “policy reasons.”98 Previously, the agency served in an
advisory capacity, and the President made the ultimate determination of
whether unfair trade practices had occurred.99 Allowing the ITC to
make final decisions paved the way for patent owners to use the agency
for fast remedies. Congress also gave the ITC the power to enforce
exclusion orders through cease-and-desist orders and civil penalties.100
But the Act also reflected the lack of input from IP scholars and
practitioners. Congress did not bind the ITC to the Patent Act. Instead,
it merely noted that the ITC should use Court of Claims and Patent
Appeals precedent as guidance and was silent regarding other patent
precedent. In the House Report, Congress gave wide latitude to the ITC
in making patent determinations: “The Commission would also consider
the evolution of patent law doctrines, including defenses based upon
antitrust and equitable principles, and the public policy of promoting a
‘free competition’ in the determination of violations of the statute.”101 It
also granted the ITC the right to consider patent defenses—including
invalidity—for purposes of § 337 “in accordance with contemporary
legal standards.”102
Congress did not consider the effect that such changes would have
on patent law. Prior to the 1974 amendments, few cases brought under
§ 337 involved patents.103 It appears that no one anticipated that
granting broad powers to the ITC for § 337 patent decisions would lead
to a rise in § 337 patent investigations. In the future, this arrangement
would lead to strategic behavior by litigants and decisions by the ITC
that hinder innovation and hurt the public.

97. The listed purposes in the Senate Report for the 1974 act include: “To strengthen the
independence of the United States Tariff Commission . . . [and t]o improve procedures for
responding to unfair trade practices in the United States and abroad.” S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 3,
4 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7187.
98. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 337(c)–(d), 88 Stat. 2053, 2054 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)–(d) (2006)).
99. See S. COMM. ON FIN., 93D CONG., COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING TRADE LAWS
WITH H.R. 10710—THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, at 116 (Comm. Print 1974).
100. Trade Act of 1974, § 337(f) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)).
101. H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 78 (1974).
102. Id.
103. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-NSAID-86-150, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: STRENGTHENING TRADE LAW PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 14
(1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://archive.gao.gov/d4t4/130844.pdf.
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF § 337
When Congress amended the Tariff Act in 1988, it was motivated by
protectionism. Congress found that safeguards against unfair trade
practices were “cumbersome and costly” and had “not provided United
States owners of IP rights with adequate protection against foreign
companies violating such rights.”104 The ITC had become popular with
U.S. patent holders, but economic tests in the provision prevented many
patent holders from using the forum.105 Policymakers feared that
inadequate protection against patent and other IP infringement was
hurting the nation’s competitiveness in the international marketplace.
These concerns led to reform under the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988.106
But Congress did not realize that expanding the ITC’s jurisdiction
over IP cases was in tension with the ITC’s core mission of protecting
domestic industry. During the debate for the bill, the ITC warned that
dropping the economic tests would compromise its ability to protect
U.S. companies and would transform the ITC into a patent enforcement
agency. Few parties foresaw that the amendments would harm domestic
companies that imported goods and would help foreign companies
enforce their U.S. IP rights.
Moreover, in making § 337 a “more effective remedy for the
protection of United States intellectual property rights,”107 Congress
increased the patent holders’ monopoly without regard to the
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained. In particular,
Congress did not require the ITC to follow the Patent Act and failed to
strengthen requirements for balancing harm to the public welfare
against harm to the patent holder.
A. Debate on Expanding § 337
By the early to mid-1980s, momentum was building for a major
revision of the Trade Act of 1974. Although small changes had been
made in the interim, Congress wanted to address the significant increase
in IP-related unfair competition investigations brought under § 337,
most of which involved patent infringement. Interest groups seized this
opportunity to expand the scope of § 337 to facilitate patent
enforcement.

104. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, § 1341(a)(2), 102
Stat. 1211, 1212 (1988).
105. See infra Part IV.B. Patent holders had to show engagement in a domestic industry,
that said industry was “efficiently and economically operated,” and that the importation of
infringing goods would “substantially injure [the] industry.” 19 U.S.C. § 337(a) (1982).
106. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1.
107. Id. § 1341(b).
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1. Shift in Use for § 337
Prior to the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, the law was seldom
used to enforce any form of IP rights.108 But the changes made in 1974
resulted in a dramatic rise in IP infringement cases. Between January
1975 and April 1985, 75% of all § 337 actions involved patent
infringement, 22% involved trademark infringement, and 4% copyright
infringement.109 Only 4% of cases did not involve IP infringement
issues.110
In 1983, ITC Chairman Alfred Eckes and other ITC officials
testified about the rise of IP cases being brought under § 337.111 Eckes
argued in favor of dropping the requirement that a domestic industry
must be efficiently and economically operated.112 Three years later, the
U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report arguing that § 337
should be amended to “more effectively protect” IP rights against
infringing imports.113 The report noted that § 337, as written, “was
intended as a trade statute to protect U.S. firms and workers against all
types of unfair foreign trade practices.”114 It stated that the 1974 Act’s
economic tests generally resulted in rights holders being “denied access
to section 337 relief.”115
Eckes highlighted the difficulty in administering the outdated
statute. He testified about the challenges of determining what
constitutes a domestic industry under § 337, stating:
In the absence of clear guidance from the statute and
legislative history, the [ITC] ha[d] been attempting on a
case-by-case basis to apply [the statute], which was written
originally more than 50 years ago, to modern
circumstances of trade in which U.S. based firms
increasingly source out elements of production to foreign
suppliers.116

108. See GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 14.
109. Id. at 15.
110. According to the GAO report, these cases involved claims such as breach of contract,
collusive bidding, and false advertising. Id. at 15 n.10.
111. See Options to Improve The Trade Remedy Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong. 21, 31 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 House
Hearings] (statement of Honorable Alfred Eckes, Chairman, U.S. International Trade
Commission); id. at 9 (statement of Ambassador Michael B. Smith, Deputy U.S. Trade Rep.).
112. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 111, at 21 (statement of Honorable Alfred
Eckes, Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission).
113. GAO Report, supra note 103, at 2.
114. Id. at 3.
115. Id. at 29.
116. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 111, at 22 (statement of Honorable Alfred Eckes,
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Eckes argued that the statute was ambiguous about whether
companies that manufactured patented products abroad, but sold the
products in the U.S., met the domestic industry requirement.117
2. Protecting U.S. Industry Through Strong Intellectual
Property Rights
The second reason for expanding § 337 was a desire to protect
domestic industry from foreign competition. The Reagan administration
supported stronger IP rights to “protect U.S. commercial interests.”118
Others argued that IP infringement threatened “international
competitiveness and foreign trade performance.”119 Some commentators
observed the high cost of international piracy on U.S. companies,
claiming that it lead to losses of $8 billion to $20 billion a year.120
Despite the claims that strengthening the enforcement of IP rights
would help U.S. companies, little attention was paid to how strong
enforcement might hurt them. U.S. patents were not held only by
domestic companies, but also by foreign companies with a limited U.S.
presence. By encouraging Congress to drop entry requirements,
policymakers inadvertently facilitated use of the ITC by foreign patent
holders. Nobody appeared to consider the effect that expanding § 337
could have on domestic companies that depended on imported
materials.
3. Advancing Innovation Through Strong Intellectual
Property Rights
The GAO advanced a minority position that U.S. IP rights should be
stronger for both domestic and foreign holders, in order to promote
innovation. The GAO report stated that “foreign firms deserve
protection under section 337,” arguing that foreign U.S. patent holders
make valuable disclosures of inventions and likely make products
available to domestic consumers.121 The report also observed that ITC
Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission).
117. Id. at 18.
118. Comprehensive Trade Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 3 Before the Subcomm. on Trade
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 105 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 House Hearings]
(statement of James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury).
119. See id. at 295 (letter from Edward Donley, Chairman of the Board, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce) (“Violations of U.S. intellectual property rights constitute a significant threat to
U.S. international competitiveness and foreign trade performance.”).
120. See Comparing Major Trade Bills: Hearing on S. 490, S. 636, and H.R. 3 Before the
S. Comm. on Fin., 100th Cong. 159 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Senate Hearings] (statement of
William T. Archey, Vice President, International, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); id. at 213–14
(statement of the Office of the Chemical Industry Trade Advisor) (discussing the problem of
foreign piracy to U.S. intellectual property holders).
121. GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 35.
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actions were preferable to district court patent litigation, given the fast
pace of § 337 proceedings, the availability of in rem jurisdiction, and
the availability of exclusion orders.122 However, although Congress
adopted much of the GAO report, it did not express interest in
strengthening the rights of foreign entities.
In making the above analysis, the GAO assumed that stronger IP
rights correlated with increased innovation. It failed to consider that
companies could use the ITC to exclude products where only a small
component of the import infringed. It also put too much faith in the ITC
to deny such an exclusion when no similar product was available on the
market.123
4. Opposition to ITC Expansion
Opposition to § 337’s expansion came from ITC Chairwoman Paula
Stern and the ITC Trial Lawyers Association. Responding to the GAO
Report, Stern maintained that eliminating the injury requirement and
other economic tests would undermine the ITC’s mission to protect
domestic industry and would transform the ITC into an IP enforcement
forum.124 The ITC Trial Lawyers Association agreed, raising the
concern that foreign companies would be able to use the ITC against
U.S. companies that import goods.125 The Association further noted that
the amendments would raise problems under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.126 These arguments did not appear to influence
Congress.
B. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
The 1988 Trade Act significantly broadened the scope of § 337,
dropping several requirements for patent holders filing complaints.
Previously, the Act required a patent holder to show that: (1) the patent
holder was engaged in a domestic industry, (2) the domestic industry
was “efficiently and economically operated,” and (3) the importation of

122. Id. at 16.
123. Both of these problems arose in In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets,
Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same,
Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543 (June 19, 2007). This case
is discussed in Part IV.
124. See id. at 84–85.
125. 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 344, 347 (comments of the ITC Trial
Lawyers Association) (“By proposing to eliminate the requirement of injury to an industry in
the United States, the amendments seek to fundamentally alter the purpose for which Section
337 was enacted . . . to protect an established or about to be established U.S. industry from
harm.”).
126. See id. at 347–49 (comments of the ITC Trial Lawyers Association); see also GAO
REPORT, supra note 103, at 85.
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infringing goods would substantially injure the industry.127 Process
patents, though covered in a separate provision, were subject to the
same three requirements.128
The 1988 Trade Act reduced many of these requirements. Under
§ 337(a)(1)(B), Congress completely eliminated the second and third
requirements for IP infringement cases, making it no longer necessary
for a patent holder to show the industry was “efficiently and
economically operated” and that infringement would lead to substantial
injury.129 These changes made it cheaper to litigate patent infringement
in the ITC130 and expanded patent holders’ access to the ITC.131
The new language also made changes regarding the treatment of
patent and other IP infringement.132 With the exception of process
patents, the prior version of the bill merely prohibited “unlawful unfair
competition,” leaving it to the ITC to determine which forms of
127. The previous version of the statute stated:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States,
or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and when
found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other
provisions of law, as provided in this section.
19 U.S.C. 337(a) (1987)
128. Section 337a stated:
The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product made, produced,
processed, or mined under or by means of a process covered by the claims of
any unexpired valid United States letters patent, shall have the same status for
the purposes of section 337 of this title as the importation of any product or
article covered by the claims of any unexpired valid United States letters
patent.
19 U.S.C. § 337a (1987).
129. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006)).
130. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 111, at 21 (statement of Honorable Alfred
Eckes, Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission) (recommending that the “efficiently
and economically operated” provision be deleted, in order to reduce the cost of litigation under
§ 337); DUVALL, supra note 26, at 4 (“[I]t is estimated that over one-half of the high cost of
section 337 litigation . . . is attributable to the legal costs of satisfying the economic criteria.”
(citing GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 31)).
131. See GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 29 (describing how eleven firms were unable to
meet the economic relief requirement between 1974 and 1986, of which, six were denied relief
solely on this ground).
132. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006)).
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infringement were included.133 The 1988 Trade Act added provisions to
§ 337 explicitly covering IP infringement, including patents. It also
extended § 337 to cover process patents.134
The new legislation also made it easier for patent holders to meet the
domestic industry requirement. Previously, in ITC actions involving
patent infringement, the Federal Circuit found that “the patent must be
exploited by production in the United States” for a domestic industry to
exist.135 The revised § 337 clarified that an industry exists for the IP in
question if there was “(A) significant investment in plant and
equipment, (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or (C)
substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering,
research and development, or licensing.”136 Because investment in
licensing counts as a domestic industry, this definition includes
universities, “intellectual property owners who engage in extensive
licensing of their rights to manufacturers,”137 and patent trolls.138
In the 1988 Trade Act, Congress failed to recognize that
protectionism and patent enforcement are not complementary
objectives. In providing patent holders with greater access to the ITC,
Congress opened the door to an increase in infringement suits brought
against domestic companies, both by domestic and foreign U.S. patent
holders. Congress failed to strengthen balancing requirements under
§ 337(d) to prevent issuance of exclusion orders when domestic
companies would be unduly harmed.139
In attempting to make § 337 serve two functions, Congress created a
provision that does neither job particularly well. It did not clarify the
role of the Patent Act in the ITC, allowing the ITC and the Federal
Circuit to declare certain parts of the Patent Act as non-binding on the

133. See 19 U.S.C. § 337 (1987).
134. See § 1337 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii)
(2006)).
135. Schaper Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 717 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-571 (1973)).
136. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)
(2006)).
137. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 1, at 157 (1987), reprinted in 2 Bernard D. Reams & Mary
Ann Nelson, Trade Reform Legislation 1988: A Legislative History of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitive-ness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 (1991).
138. See William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to
this Judicial Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 299-302 (2007) (discussing how the term “patent troll”
has been expanded to include inventors who obtains a patent but have no plans to produce a
product under it).
139. Although § 1337(d) requires that the ITC balance the benefit of an exclusion order
with the harm to the public welfare, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1988) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006)), competitive conditions in the United States economy, and other
factors, exclusion orders are very rarely denied on such grounds. See infra Part VI.A.1.
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ITC.140 Congress failed to grant ITC proceedings collateral estoppel
effect in federal court to ensure coherency in patent law. The 1988
statutory language also allowed the ITC to continue issuing broad
exclusion orders whenever it found patent infringement. This situation
has prevented respondent companies from making innovative products,
even when the patent at issue covers only a small component of the
product and when the patent holder does not offer a similar product.141
To resolve this tension, Congress could refocus § 337 to protect
domestic industry. One way to achieve this goal would be to prohibit
§ 337 investigations against companies over which U.S. courts have
personal jurisdiction. This change would protect U.S. companies from
§ 337 litigation.142 Congress could likewise reintroduce the pre-1988
domestic industry requirement, making it harder for foreign companies
to use the agency.
Regardless of whether such protectionism is warranted, such a
change is highly unlikely. In making it easier to litigate patent disputes
before the ITC, Congress acknowledged that § 337’s main purpose was
for IP enforcement. The ITC has become far too valuable as a patent
litigation forum—by offering patent holders fast proceedings, unique
relief, and judges well-versed in patent law.
V. DIVERGENCE OF ITC AND FEDERAL COURT PATENT LAW
Six years before passing the 1988 Trade Act, Congress created the
Federal Circuit to decrease forum shopping and reduce inconsistencies
in federal adjudication.143 But Congress did not consider how federal
agencies fit into the fabric of patent jurisprudence—neither when
creating the Federal Circuit nor when revising the Trade Act.
As the caseload in the ITC has grown over the past ten years,
questions have begun to emerge regarding whether the Patent Act, in its
entirety, applies to the ITC. In Kinik Co. v. International Trade
Commission, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s finding that
140. See infra Part V.
141. This point was illustrated in In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets,
Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same,
Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621
(June 19, 2007), rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See infra Part VI.B.
142. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 60, at 488; Editorial, Hot Topic: Patent Bending,
WALL ST. J., June 9, 2007, at A8 (“If Congress really wants to help, it could start by refusing to
let companies like Broadcom use the ITC as a legal backstop at the same time they’re suing in
federal court.”).
143. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982);
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981).
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defenses under § 271(g) of the Patent Act—pertaining to process
patents—do not apply under § 337.144 This decision was extremely
controversial and led to debate over whether Congress intended the ITC
to be bound by the Patent Act.145 The ITC and Federal Circuit abruptly
reversed course a few years later in another case pertaining to process
patents, Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission.146 In this case,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s holding that the safe-harbor
provision under § 271(e) is applicable in § 337 proceedings.147
Other issues have emerged from the rise in parallel ITC/district court
litigation, exacerbated by the fact that ITC decisions are not entitled to
preclusive effect in federal court.148 The result has been strategic
behavior by litigants, and sometimes, conflicting decisions between the
forums, leading to uncertainty.149 These issues highlight the need to
144. 362 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This was not the first time that the ITC found
that § 271(g) defenses did not apply in § 337 proceedings. See In re Recombinantly Produced
Human Growth Hormones, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-358, 1994 WL 930040 (Nov. 29, 1994)
(holding that the 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) exception does not apply to respondent, and refusing to
apply the § 271(g) grandfather clause because “the legislative history cited by [respondent] does
not establish that the Process Patent Act was enacted to modify remedies previously available
under section 337. Rather, the Process Patent Act provides for an additional remedy in the
district courts”); Notice of Issuance of Limited Exclusion Order and Cease and Desist Orders, In
re Plastic Encapsulated Integrated Circuits, USITC Pub. 2574, Inv. No. 337-TA-315, 1992 WL
813959 (Oct. 1992) (letting stand the ALJ’s opinion that “the Patent Amendments recognized
section 337 as an independent cause of action in that the addition of section 271(g) did not
deprive a patent owner of any remedies available under section 337”); Order No. 19, In re
Methods of Making Carbonated Candy Products, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-292, 1989 WL
608892 (Sept. 1, 1989) (holding that § 271(g) defenses cannot be raised in § 337 proceedings).
145. See Process Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 86–
87 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Senate Hearings] (statement of John Thomas, Professor of Law,
Georgetown Law School) (testifying that the ITC interprets the Patent Act whenever it makes
patent-related determinations, and that it was thus improper of the Kinik court to grant Chevron
deference to the agency); Rodgers & Whitlock, supra note 59, at 471 (stating that in § 337
cases, the ITC applies “the same substantive patent law as a federal district court would”); John
M. Eden, Comment, Unnecessary Indeterminacy: Process Patent Protection After Kinik v. ITC,
2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, ¶ 12 (2006), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2
006DLTR0009.pdf. But see 2007 Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 44 (written statement of
Christopher A. Cotropia, Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law)
(testifying that while district courts are charged to enforce patents via the Patent Act, the ITC
polices trade-related activities and protects domestic industries under the Tariff Act (citing 19
U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2), (3) (1988); Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017,
1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).
146. No. 2007-1014, 2009 WL 1151856, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2009).
147. Id. at 1345.
148. See infra Part V.B.
149. See Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at *2–3

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/3

24

Kumar: The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC

2009]

THE OTHER PATENT AGENCY

553

restore uniformity between agency and federal court patent proceedings.
A. Process Patents and Applicable Defenses
1. Kinik v. ITC
In Kinik, the Taiwan-based Kinik Company argued that its products
did not infringe a 3M process patent.150 It maintained that the patented
process “was materially changed by a subsequent process,” thus
providing it with a defense under § 271(g) of the Patent Act.151 The ALJ
rejected this defense and found Kinik’s products infringed the 3M
patent.152
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed this part of the decision,153
though it ultimately ruled against the ITC on other grounds.154 Judge
Newman, writing for the panel, concluded that defenses under
§ 271(g)(1) and (g)(2) do not apply in § 337 proceedings.155 The
decision was based on the legislative history and the text of the Process
Patent Amendments Act of 1988, which states that defenses apply only
“for purposes of this title.”156 The court subsequently granted Chevron
deference to the ITC, finding that it interpreted its own statute, § 337,
and not the Patent Act.157
Kinik generated immense backlash, leading to hearings in 2007
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Georgetown law professor John
Thomas testified that the ITC interprets the Patent Act whenever it
makes patent-related determinations.158 He noted the “numerous
complications that arise from varying enforcement possibilities between
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001) (noting that with regard to parallel ITC/federal court patent litigation,
“permitting parallel proceedings involving identical fact patterns applying identical law permits
parties to engage in forum shopping”). Note, however, that Kali Murray argues that this type of
divergence in patent law is actually beneficial, because the ITC can offer an alternative
perspective on patent law that ultimately improves patent jurisprudence. See Kali N. Murray,
The Cooperation of Many Minds: Domestic Patent Reform in a Heterogeneous Regime, 48
IDEA 289, 301 (2008).
150. In re Abrasive Products Made Using a Process for Making Powder Preforms, USITC
Inv. No. 337-TA-449, 2002 WL 480986 (Feb. 8, 2002), aff’d sub nom, Kinik Co. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
151. Abrasive Products, 2002 WL 480986.
152. Id.
153. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1363.
154. Id. at 1359.
155. Id. at 1361.
156. See id. at 1362 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006)).
157. Id. at 1363.
158. See 2007 Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 85 (statement of John R. Thomas,
Professor of Law, Georgetown University); see also Rogers & Whitlock, supra note 59, at 471
(stating that in § 337 cases, the ITC applies “the same substantive patent law as a federal district
court would”); Eden, supra note 144, ¶ 12.
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the ITC and the federal district courts.”159
Other commentators contended that Kinik correctly supported the
proposition that the ITC has independent jurisdiction. University of
Richmond law professor Christopher Cotropia argued that while district
courts are charged with enforcing patents via the Patent Act, the ITC,
under the Tariff Act, polices trade-related activities and protects
domestic industries.160 Thus, as American Intellectual Property Law
Association director Michael Kirk noted: “Section 337 proceedings in
the ITC have a separate statutory basis from patent infringement actions
brought in federal court.”161 Unlike general patent proceedings, they
“are intended to protect domestic industries and the public interest.”162
Consequently, it is not inconsistent for a defense in district court patent
litigation to not apply in the ITC.163
2. Amgen v. ITC
What little light Kinik shed on the relationship between the Patent
Act and § 337 was extinguished by the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Amgen v. International Trade Commission.164 This case involved the 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)165 safe harbor, which allows companies to infringe
some gene technology patents for the purposes of drug development and
obtaining drug approval.166 Writing for the majority, Judge Newman
found that § 271(e) does apply to imported products that violate a
process patent in § 337 proceedings.167 The majority brushed aside its
reasoning in Kinik168 and focused its analysis on two cases where the
159. 2007 Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 87 (statement of John R. Thomas, Professor
of Law, Georgetown University).
160. See id. at 44 (written statement of Christopher Cotropia, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Richmond Law School).
161. Id. at 78 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual
Property Law Association).
162. Id.
163. See id. at 44 (written statement of Christopher Cotropia, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Richmond Law School) (“There are, however, reasons not to label these as truly
‘inconsistent’ judgments. . . . District courts pursuant to Title 35 are tasked with the specific
mandate to enforce patent protections, while the ITC under Title 19 is meant to police traderelated activities and protect domestic industries.”); id. at 78 (statement of Michael K. Kirk,
Executive Director, AIPLA) (“Because ITC and federal court actions have different purposes
and involve different remedies, there is nothing inconsistent with Congress’s decision, in
passing the [Process Patent Amendments Act], not to extend the two specific, newly-created
defenses to infringement under Section 271(g) to the preexisting requirements for Section 337
proceedings in the ITC.”).
164. No. 2007-1014, 2009 WL 1151856, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2009).
165. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
166. Amgen, 2009 WL 1151856, at *2.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id. at *4.
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Supreme Court had interpreted § 271(e) broadly.169 Although these
cases did not involve the ITC, the Federal Circuit used the decisions to
justify its decision that Congress intended the safe harbor to apply to
§ 337 proceedings.170
The Federal Circuit disregarded two textual arguments that
disfavored the application of § 271(e) to ITC proceedings. First, Amgen
argued that § 271(e)(1) expressly limits the safe harbor to drug
manufacturers that import a product that infringes a U.S. patent.171 The
provision does not address the importation of goods manufactured in
violation of a process patent. Second, as Judge Linn noted in his
dissent,172 § 337(a)(1)(B) “declares unlawful the importation . . . of
articles that ‘are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by
means of, a process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable
United States patent.’”173 As Judge Linn concluded, under the plain
language of the provision, exclusion orders should be available
regardless of whether infringement occurred.174
In his dissent, Judge Linn accused the majority of disregarding the
statutory text and legislative history of § 271(e) in order to harmonize
the Tariff Act with the Patent Act.175 He noted that the scope of the
Patent Act and § 337 for imported goods made by a process patent has
differed for nearly seventy years and that importation of such goods was
not infringement until Congress passed the 1988 Process Patent
Amendment Act.176
The Kinik and Amgen decisions illustrate the high degree of
uncertainty in § 337 patent proceedings. The limits of a patent in the
ITC are unknown, because the ITC and Federal Circuit have taken a
piecemeal approach to determining which parts of the Patent Act apply.
Such clarification, moreover, takes years. The Federal Circuit handed
down the Amgen decision twenty-five years after Congress added
§ 271(e) to the Patent Act;177 the court decided Kinik sixteen years after
169. See id. (“[Section] 271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of
patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any
information under the [Food Drug and Cosmetic Act].” (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005))); id. (“[A]lthough the statute mentions only
drugs and veterinary products[,] the Court stated that ‘[t]he phrase “patented invention” in
§ 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.’” (third
alteration in original) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990))).
170. Id.
171. Id. at *2; see 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) (2006).
172. Id. at *8 (Linn, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at *8–9.
176. Id.
177. Section 271(e) was added to the Patent Act under the Drug Price Competition and
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Congress passed the Process Patent Amendments Act.178 This
uncertainty can raise the cost of developing new products and hinder
licensing.179
3. Applicable Defenses
The Kinik decision also highlights divergence between defenses
available in federal district court versus the ITC. Under § 337(c), “[a]ll
legal and equitable defenses may be presented in all cases.”180 Prior to
Kinik, it was generally assumed that this language meant that the ITC
must accept all valid patent defenses in patent infringement cases. But
the ITC and the Kinik court found that at least two Patent Act defenses
are not available in § 337 litigation. A product made by a patented
process is not deemed infringing in federal court if the product “is
materially changed by subsequent processes” or if it “becomes a trivial
and nonessential component of another product.”181 Such a product is,
however, infringing in the ITC. This disparity raises the question
whether other defenses are unavailable as well.
One possible interpretation of § 337(c) is that the phrase “may be
presented”182 grants the ITC the right to hear defenses, but leaves the
agency with latitude to determine which defenses it accepts. The ITC’s
predecessor, the Tariff Commission, was not permitted to consider
patent validity defenses. According to the 1974 House Report, the ITC
was given the authority “to take into consideration such legal defenses
and to make findings thereon for the purposes of determining whether
section 337 is being violated.”183 But this position is not supported by
the court’s decision in Vastframe Camera, Ltd. v. International Trade
Commission.184 The court held that the phrase “all cases” encompasses
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984).
178. The Process Patent Amendments Act was passed in 1988, as part of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. 100-418, tit. IX, subtitle A, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563 (1988).
179. See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent
Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 175, 175 (2001) (arguing that patent uncertainty makes it difficult for lawyers to
effectively litigate patent cases); Willard K. Tom & Alexis J. Gilman, U.S. and E.C. Antitrust
Approaches to Patent Uncertainty, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 859, 890 (2003) (“Since people
make decisions (e.g. to invest in research and development, license a patent, or settle a case) in
anticipation of how the law will treat their conduct, uncertainty about how the law will be
applied may adversely affect those decisions to the extent people are risk averse.”).
180. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006).
181. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).
182. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 78 (1974).
184. 386 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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investigations under § 337(b)185 and noted that “[t]he necessary
result . . . is that participants in a proceeding under [§ 337(b)] must be
permitted to raise all defenses.”186 This implies that § 337(c) provides a
right to the respondent, rather than discretion to the ITC.
These cases fail to clarify the meaning of “all legal and equitable
defenses” under § 337(c).187 Kinik and Amgen, together, imply that
unless Congress says otherwise, the ITC must allow all patent defenses.
But Amgen also shows that the ITC exercises immense discretion in
determining Congress’s intent, which causes uncertainty regarding
defenses. Kinik, Vastframe Camera, and Amgen highlight the need for
Congress to clarify the relationship between the Patent Act and § 337.
4. Applying the Patent Act to § 337 Patent Proceedings
Congress should clarify that the Patent Act applies, in its entirety, to
§ 337 patent proceedings. If Congress did so, it would alleviate
confusion whenever the Patent Act is amended. More specifically,
Congress should amend § 337(a)(1)(B) to declare unlawful:
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for
importation, or the sale within the United States after
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of
articles that, in violation of title 35, United States Code—
(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent; or
(ii) are made by a process covered by the claims of a valid
and enforceable United States patent.
The part of § 337(a)(1)(B)(i) that pertains to copyright law would be
moved to a separate subsection.
The proposed change would have a number of benefits. It would
ensure that the ITC applies the same law as federal courts in deciding
patent issues, thereby reducing uncertainty in ITC litigation and
lessening the opportunity for patent holders to forum shop or engage in
other strategic behavior. If the importation of a product does not violate
the Patent Act because it fell under the § 271(e) safe harbor or a
§ 271(g) defense, then the patent holder will not be able to obtain an
exclusion order against the product in the ITC.
Binding the ITC to the Patent Act raises the issue of whether
imported infringing goods should be treated differently in the ITC to
protect U.S. companies. As Judge Linn notes in his Amgen dissent, the
scope of Title 35 and § 337 differed for imported goods for nearly

185. Id. at 1115.
186. Id.
187. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c).
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seventy years.188 The view that imported infringing goods should be
treated more harshly than domestically produced infringing goods is
consistent with Congress’s intent in 1974 in allowing the ITC to
interpret patents for its own purpose.
But unequal treatment of imported versus domestic infringing goods
no longer makes sense. A significant percentage of ITC actions are
brought against domestic companies, blurring the distinction between
ITC and federal court patent actions. Consequently, a different standard
for patent infringement in the ITC can harm domestic companies as
much as it can help them.
B. Administrative Estoppel
The Supreme Court has “long favored application of the commonlaw doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to
claims)” to final determinations made by administrative agencies.189 In
Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Solimino, the Court
stated:
Such repose is justified on the sound and obvious principle
of judicial policy that a losing litigant deserves no rematch
after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on
an issue identical in substance to the one he subsequently
seeks to raise. To hold otherwise would, as a general
matter, impose unjustifiably upon those who have already
shouldered their burdens, and drain the resources of an
adjudicatory system with disputes resisting resolution.190
Federal court decisions bind the ITC.191 For example, during one
ITC investigation, the ALJ issued an initial determination finding no
infringement of the patent holder’s patent.192 Before the Commission
reviewed the decision, however, a district court ruled that one of the
patents at issue in the ITC proceeding was invalid.193 The ITC
consequently found the patent invalid based on collateral estoppel.194

188. Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2007-1014, 2009 WL 1151856, at *8
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2009) (Linn, J., dissenting).
189. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991).
190. Id. at 107–08 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)).
191. See Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to an ITC proceeding that follows a
district court decision).
192. In re EPROM, EEPROM, Flash Memory, and Flash Microcontroller Semiconductor
Devices, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-395, 1998 ITC LEXIS 371, at *2–3 (July 9, 1998).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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But ITC determinations of patent issues are not given preclusive
effect by federal courts.195 This position rests on two grounds. First, the
Federal Circuit maintains that federal district courts have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, and
that the ITC’s authority under § 337 is limited to investigating unfair
practices in import trade.196 Second, the legislative history for the Trade
Act of 1974 states that ITC decisions are not entitled to preclusive
effect.197 In the Senate Report, Congress stated:
[I]n patent-based cases, the Commission considers, for its
own purposes under section 337, the status of imports with
respect to the claims of U.S. patents. The Commission’s
findings neither purport to be, nor can they be, regarded as
binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws in particular
factual contexts. Therefore, it seems clear that any
disposition of a Commission action by a Federal Court
should not have a res judicata
or collateral estoppel effect
in cases before such courts.198
This position made sense in 1974, because at that time, the ITC heard
few patent cases and had little expertise in the area.199
Stranger still, Federal Circuit decisions reviewing ITC proceedings
do not bind future district court proceedings. Citing the legislative
history quoted above, the court in Tandon Corp. v. International Trade
Commission200 stated that its “appellate treatment of decisions of the
Commission does not estop fresh consideration by other tribunals.”201
At least one commentator has questioned whether Tandon is still good
law.202
195. See Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that a prior ITC decision does not bind a subsequent federal court under the doctrine of
claim preclusion); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 851 F.2d 342, 344 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (“[T]his court has stated that the ITC’s determinations regarding patent issues should
be given no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect . . . .”).
196. See Bio-Tech. Gen., 80 F.3d at 1564.
197. Id.; see also Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s appellate treatment of ITC decisions “does not
estop fresh consideration by other tribunals”).
198. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 196 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7329.
199. Another argument is that the creation of the Federal Circuit rendered the 1974
language moot and that there is implied Congressional intent “to provide uniform interpretation
of the patent laws and prevent forum shopping in patent cases.” Order No. 3, In re Apparatus for
Disintegration of Urinary Calculi, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-221, 1985 WL 303900 (June 6,
1985). However, this argument is weak because the legislative history behind the creation of the
Federal Circuit gives no indication that Congress intended to change the treatment of ITC
proceedings.
200. 831 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
201. Id. at 1019 (citing Lannom Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 799 F.2d 1572,
1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
202. Terril G. Lewis, Collateral Estoppel as Applied to the Construction of Patent Claims
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Res judicata for § 337 decisions does not make sense, given that
cash damages are unavailable in the ITC.203 But Congress’s rationale
for denying collateral estoppel effect to ITC decisions is no longer
valid, given that patent cases comprise a substantial portion of the
agency’s docket. Consequently, Congress should revise the provision to
explicitly grant collateral estoppel effect to ITC proceedings.
1. Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, states that “a party
must raise in a single lawsuit all the grounds of recovery arising from a
single transaction or series of transactions that can be brought
together.”204 According to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the
doctrine is based on the assumption that the jurisdiction of the original
judgment did not bar the litigant from presenting “in one action the
entire claim including any theories of recovery or demands for relief
that might have been available to him under applicable law.”205
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments notes that when “formal
barriers” prevent a litigant from presenting the entire claim, “it is unfair
to preclude him from a second action” where the rest of the claim may
be presented.206 Thus, it is unsurprising that federal courts do not apply
res judicata to ITC proceedings. As the Federal Circuit has pointed out,
the ITC offers exclusion orders, and not cash damages, for patent
infringement.207 Given the different forms of relief, the application of
res judicata is not appropriate.
The ITC, however, is obligated to give res judicata effect to district
court decisions.208 The Federal Circuit has taken a “pragmatic
approach,” arguing that if a patent owner unsuccessfully attacked an
alleged infringer for the same acts in a prior court proceeding, the patent
(Part I), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 851, 877 (noting that after Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), “it seems that the renewed emphasis on the stare decisis
effect of a Federal Circuit claim construction will bind all lower tribunals regardless of whether
collateral estoppel is appropriate, making the holding of Tandon moot in this context” (footnote
omitted)).
203. See ITC FAQ, supra note 17, at 22.
204. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, 80 F.3d at 1553, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(quotations omitted).
205. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) cmt. c (1982)).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) cmt. c (1982).
207. See Bio-Tech. Gen., 80 F.3d at 1564 (holding that a prior ITC decision concerning
patent infringement or validity “cannot have claim preclusive effect in the district court”).
208. See id. at 1564 n.9 (citing Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d
1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“The district court’s proceedings also potentially have a direct effect on the Commission’s
investigation because the district court’s decision on infringement might be entitled to collateral
estoppel effect in the Commission proceedings.”).
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holder should not be given the opportunity to do so again in the ITC.209
Nevertheless, this doctrine rarely comes into play in ITC proceedings.
Patent holders can avoid res judicata by filing in the ITC first, or by
filing an ITC action with the district court action so that the federal
court decision does not issue prior to the ITC final determination.
2. Collateral Estoppel
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue
preclusion, “once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary
to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a
suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.”210
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the collateral estoppel
is to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,
conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions,
encourage reliance on adjudication.”211 Collateral estoppel generally
applies if: (1) there is identity of the issues in a prior proceeding, (2) the
issues were actually litigated, (3) the determination of the issues was
necessary to the resulting judgment, and (4) the party defending against
preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.212
Two-thirds of all ITC proceedings have an associated district court
proceeding.213 One would expect that in the interest of consistency and
efficiency, the collateral estoppel would apply for federal decisions that
follow ITC proceedings and vice-versa. This arrangement would reduce
the incentive for parties to strategically engage in dual litigation.214
At present, however, an ITC proceeding cannot estop a district court
proceeding. The legislative history from the 1974 Trade Act has
prevented district courts from granting collateral estoppel effect to ITC
decisions215 or to Federal Circuit decisions that review of ITC
209. Young Eng’rs, 721 F.2d at 1315.
210. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 153 (1979)).
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979); Jet, Inc. v. Sewage
Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
213. See Chien, supra note 64, at 70.
214. It is important to note that if a patent holder takes a position in the ITC that results in a
determination in his or her favor, the doctrine of judicial estoppel will prevent the patent holder
from advancing a contrary position in subsequent federal litigation. See Mitchell v.
Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999).
215. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568–69
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that prior ITC patent actions do not lead to issue preclusion of federal
court actions); In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 721 F. Supp. 596, 603 (D. Del.
1989), aff’d, 903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he legislative history of the Trade Reform Act
of 1974 provides that ITC determinations should not estop other federal courts from reviewing
the same patent.”).
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decisions.216 In the legislative history of the 1974 Act, Congress noted
that it did not want ITC patent decisions to have collateral estoppel
effect on subsequent federal court proceedings. In the 1974 House
Report, Congress stated that the ITC is not empowered “to set aside a
patent as being invalid or to render it unenforceable.”217 Rather, the ITC
can merely “take into consideration such legal defenses and . . . make
findings thereon for the purposes [sic] of determining whether section
337 is being violated.”218
Congress also failed to clarify the extent to which the ITC is bound
by the Patent Act. Prongs two through four of the collateral estoppel
test219 would generally be met in parallel litigation for patent
infringement, where the ITC issues its decision first. Issues of claim
interpretation, patent validity, and various defenses would need to be
litigated for the patent holder to receive an exclusion order. The
respondent would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate because the
ITC engages in formal adjudication in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act under § 337(c).220
The first part of the collateral estoppel test, however, requires that
there exist “identity of the issues in a prior proceeding.”221 Kinik
illustrates that to some degree, Congress created a law outside the
Patent Act to address patent issues in the ITC.222 This provision
precludes an “identity of the issues” in dual proceedings. Indeed, an
argument can be made that under a proper reading of § 337 and the
Administrative Procedure Act, the ITC has independent jurisdiction
over patent cases and is eligible for deference under Chevron U.S.A. v.
National Resources Defense Council.223 In transforming § 337 into a
216. See Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“[O]ur appellate treatment of decisions of the Commission does not estop fresh consideration
by other tribunals.”).
217. H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 78 (1974).
218. Id.
219. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
220. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006) (“Any person adversely affected by a final determination
of the Commission under subsection (d), (e), (f), or (g) of this section may appeal such
determination, within 60 days after the determination becomes final, to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for review in accordance with chapter 7 of Title 5.”).
Note that in order to have a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” a patent issue in the ITC,
for estoppel purposes, a respondent in an ITC action would need the opportunity to raise all the
defenses in the § 337 proceeding that it could in a district court action. This could be
accomplished by making the change to § 337 suggested in Part V.A.4, which would make the
Patent Act binding on ITC patent proceedings.
221. Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
222. See 2007 Senate Hearings, supra note 144 (written statement of Christopher Cotropia,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law) (arguing that “Congress
purposively created separate and different standards for the two causes of actions” with regard
to process patents).
223. See Sapna Kumar, Chevron Deference and the ITC (University of Houston Law
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patent enforcement provision but failing to grant the ITC’s decisions
preclusive effect, Congress did not take advantage of the vast expertise
that the ITC has acquired in patent law. It did not realize that rendering
patent determinations has become part of the ITC’s mandate to regulate
trade,224 and that federal courts no longer have exclusive jurisdiction
over all patent matters. Instead, Congress has allowed parallel
proceedings to continue unchecked.
3. Granting Collateral Estoppel Effect to ITC Proceedings
Applying the Patent Act to § 337 proceedings is not sufficient to
reduce dual litigation because it will not prevent patent holders from
filing a district court action when they are unhappy with an ITC
decision. The best solution is to grant ITC actions collateral estoppel
effect on federal courts. This change would prevent parties from gaming
the system. It would also prevent parties from bearing the unnecessary
cost of re-litigating patent issues.225
By amending § 337 to make the Patent Act binding, proceedings in
the ITC would generally meet all four requirements of the collateral
estoppel test. But this action, alone, is not sufficient for collateral
estoppel to apply, because the Federal Circuit denies issue preclusion to
the ITC based on the statements made in the House and Senate Report
for the Trade Act of 1974. It would therefore be necessary that
Congress make an affirmative statement about the applicability of the
collateral estoppel doctrine in its next trade bill.
One concern is whether granting collateral estoppel to an agency
would violate the Seventh Amendment. The right to trial by jury applies
for certain aspects of patent infringement cases.226 If the issue of
infringement is litigated in the ITC and given preclusive effect in
federal court, then the respondents would be denied this right to a jury
trial. Indeed, in dicta, the Federal Circuit has stated that “allowing prior
ITC decisions on patent infringement questions to have preclusive
effect would potentially deprive the parties of their Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial on the issue of infringement.”227

Center Working Paper).
224. Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 9, 2001).
225. See Hal D. Baird, Note, Res Judicata Effect of United States International Trade
Commission Patent Decisions, BYU J. PUB. L. 127, 138 (1992) (noting that the lack of
preclusive effect for ITC decisions “forces parties to bear tremendous and unnecessary
economic and administrative burdens”).
226. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
227. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 n.10
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
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It is unlikely that such a Seventh Amendment problem would arise.
In Granfinanciera v. Nordberg,228 the Supreme Court held that
Congress cannot assign adjudication of an existing private right to an
administrative agency or court of equity.229 But the Court went on to
say that “Congress may fashion causes of action that are closely
analogous to common-law claims and place them beyond the ambit of
the Seventh Amendment by assigning their resolution to a forum in
which jury trials are unavailable.”230
Granfinanceria, however, does not address whether a properly made
determination from an agency or court of equity can bind a subsequent
legal proceeding. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,231 the Supreme
Court held that “an equitable determination can have collateral-estoppel
effect in a subsequent legal action and that this estoppel does not violate
the Seventh Amendment.”232 The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished
decision, applied Parklane Hosiery and found no Seventh Amendment
problems for giving preclusive effect to an ITC trademark decision.233
The court noted that after an ITC investigation begins, a concerned
party can always seek expedited proceedings in a district court and
assert its right to jury trial claim prior to the ITC’s initial
determination.234 Likewise, in an unpublished Tenth Circuit decision,
the court held that applying res judicata to a state agency decision did
not violate the right to trial by jury.235
These decisions are consistent with the Parklane Court’s
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment:
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the
common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the
common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of
evidence then prevailing. Nor were ‘the rules of the
common law’ then prevalent, including those relating to the
procedure by which the judge regulated the jury’s role on
228. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
229. Id. at 51–52 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 457–58 (1977)).
230. Id. at 52.
231. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
232. Id. at 335–36 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334 (1966)).
233. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Samsonite Corp., No. 91-2171, 1992 WL 296368, at *4
(4th Cir. Oct. 16, 1992).
234. Id.
235. Slavens v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, No. 91-8074, 1993 WL 307906, at *4 (10th Cir.
Aug. 13, 1993) (citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 337); see also Consolidated Express, Inc.
v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n, 641 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The defendants object that if the final
hearing in this case is delayed while the [National Labor Relations] Board proceeding goes
forward they may, if the Board’s decision is adverse, be deprived of trial by jury on some issues
by virtue of collateral estoppel. That is true, but it is nothing of which defendants can
complain.” (citing Parklane Hoisery, 439 U.S. at 333–37)).
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questions of236fact, crystallized in a fixed and immutable
system . . . .
The Seventh Amendment was instead “designed to preserve the
basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not
the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then so
widely among common-law jurisdictions.”237 Federal courts granting
collateral estoppel effect to ITC decisions would likewise not
undermine the basic right to trial by jury for patent infringement cases.
It would affect only the subset of cases where jurisdiction exists in both
the ITC and federal court, and where the plaintiff pursues dual
litigation.
Another argument could be made that granting collateral estoppel
effect to patent decisions would violate the district court’s exclusive and
original jurisdiction over patent cases. But this contention is not correct.
The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) reads: “The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act
of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the
states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.” If federal
courts are required to grant preclusive effect to ITC patent decisions,
this requirement will not alter the original jurisdiction of the courts.
Case law for trademark decisions in the ITC have permitted preclusion,
finding no issue with the first sentence of § 1338(a).238 The second
sentence merely prohibits state courts from hearing patent cases.239 The
ITC, as an agency, is clearly not affected.
VI. EXCLUSION ORDERS
Exclusion orders are the primary reason that parties choose to
litigate in the ITC. Unlike injunctions in federal court, which proscribe
the conduct of the infringer, exclusion orders direct U.S. Customs to
seize infringing goods at the border.240 This remedy is by no means
perfect. If the ITC issues a limited exclusion order, it directs Customs to
seize only goods which bear certain serial numbers. An infringer can
stay one step ahead of Customs and the ITC by creating new lines of

236. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 336–37 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S.
372, 390–91) (1943)).
237. Id. at 337 (quoting Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392).
238. See Order No. 3, In re Apparatus for Disintegration of Urinary Calculi, USITC Inv.
No. 337-TA-221, 1985 WL 303900 (June 6, 1985).
239. See id. (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) “alone need not be construed as
depriving the Commission’s decisions of res judicata effect since the ITC is not a state court”).
240. See Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Industry Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
535 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Blakeslee, supra note 48 at 252.
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infringing goods.241 Nevertheless, exclusion orders provide patent
holders with a mechanism for dealing with infringers that is more
efficient than suing once infringing goods enter the marketplace.
Injunctive relief in federal court, moreover, is difficult to obtain. In
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,242 the Supreme Court held that to
obtain permanent injunctive relief, a patent holder must show:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.243
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by three other justices, states
that “the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function
of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases.”244
The concurrence further notes:
When the patented invention is but a small component of
the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of
an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not
serve the public interest.245
The ITC issues injunctive relief, in the form of exclusion orders,
under a more relaxed standard than in eBay. Although the ITC may
deny exclusion orders or narrow their scope to avoid harm to the public
welfare,246 the ITC instead issues them whenever there is a finding of
infringement, and it downplays policy concerns when determining their
scope. The rationale for this approach, in part, is the assumption that the
strong enforcement of patent rights through injunctive relief promotes
innovation. But the ITC overlooks the direct harm that an exclusion
order can cause to competitors and consumers.
The ITC’s application of § 337 is far from ideal, but nevertheless,
the greater problem lies with Congress. Section 337 fails to specify
241. For a discussion of how companies can redesign goods to comply with ITC exclusion
orders, see Steven E. Adkins & John Evans, Several Healthy Steps Away: New & Improved
Products in Section 337 Investigations, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 309 (2009).
242. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
243. Id. at 391.
244. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 396–97.
246. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006).
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circumstances in which the ITC should not issue exclusion orders.
Congress, moreover, provides inadequate guidance to the ITC—as well
as to courts and the PTO—about how to promote innovation through
the patent system. To remedy these shortcomings, Congress must
recognize the role that the ITC is forced to play in formulating patent
policy and take a holistic approach to promoting innovation through
patents.
A. Widespread Availability
1. Denying Exclusion Orders on Public Policy Grounds
If the ITC finds that an imported article infringes a patent, then the
default presumption under § 337 is that it will award an exclusion
order.247 However, if “after considering the effect of such exclusion
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in
the United States, and United States consumers,” the ITC can deny an
exclusion order.248 The Federal Circuit has held that the ITC has “broad
discretion” in making remedy determinations under this provision.249
The ITC addresses two issues. It first considers whether there is a
public health and welfare interest related to the invention that could be
negatively affected by an exclusion order.250 If so, the ITC balances
“the damage to the patent holder’s rights against the adverse impact of
the remedy on ‘the public health and welfare and the assurance of
competitive conditions in the United States economy.’”251
But in practice, denials of injunctive relief after a finding of
infringement are extremely uncommon, having occurred in only three

247. See id.
248. See id.; In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver
(Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular
Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *284 (June 19,
2007), rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Mindful of the potentially disruptive effect on the U.S. economy that a
broad exclusion order could have, Congress provided the Commission with the discretion not to
impose such a broad exclusion if the Commission found that it would not be in the public
interest.”).
249. Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (“‘[T]he Commission has broad discretion in selecting the form, scope, and extent of
the remedy, and judicial review of its choice of remedy necessarily is limited.’” (quoting
Viscofan, S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
250. See Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *293 (Pearson, Chairman &
Pinkert, Comm’r, dissenting) (quoting In re Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components
Thereof, USITC Pub. 1119, Inv. No. 337-TA-67 (Dec. 1980)); S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 197
(1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7330.
251. Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *293 (quoting Inclined-Field
Acceleration, Inv. No. 337-TA-67).
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investigations in the thirty-five year history of the ITC.252 The most
recent instance of denial of an exclusion order was in 1984, when the
ITC denied temporary relief on public policy grounds in In re Fluidized
Supporting Apparatus.253 The patents at issue covered beds for burn
victims that were both superior to any on the market and in short supply
because the patent holder was unable to produce enough beds to meet
demand.254
The other two cases involved overriding patent rights in times of
national crisis. In re Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes was decided in
1980, during the Cold War.255 The patent in question covered devices
used in weapons development, for which there were no suitable
replacements.256 The ITC, in In re Automatic Crankpin Grinders, found
that a shortage of a patented auto part was preventing car manufacturers
from improving fuel efficiency during the 1979 energy crisis.257
Thus, short of a national crisis or a matter of life and death, the ITC
will not deny an exclusion order after finding a violation of § 337. In
contrast, post-eBay, federal district courts have denied injunctive relief
merely because the plaintiff failed to show that it would otherwise
suffer irreparable harm.258 This disparity has likely contributed to the
rise in ITC litigation, and consequently, the rise in parallel litigation.
2. Adjusting the Scope of Exclusion Orders
The ITC may choose to narrow an exclusion order based on public
policy considerations or on the burden of enforcement. As a general
matter, “[t]he Commission first determines what remedy is appropriate,
including the scope of that remedy.”259 It then, “based on consideration
of the statutory public interest factors, determines whether any remedy
at all should issue.”260
252. In re Foam Masking Tape, USITC Pub. 3968, Inv. No. 337-TA-528, 2007 WL
4824257, at n.7 (Dec. 2007) (noting that the ITC “has declined to issue a remedy based on the
public interest in only three investigations”).
253. USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-182/188, 1984 WL 273801 (Oct. 1984).
254. Id.
255. USITC Pub. 1119, Inv. No. 337-TA-67, 1980 WL 140675 (Dec. 1980).
256. Id.
257. USITC Pub. 1022, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, 1979 WL 61022 (Dec. 1979).
258. See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007) (finding that
the plaintiff’s assertion that it would lose research opportunities, market share, and profit did not
explain why cash damages were insufficient to justify injunctive relief). According to an
empirical study by Chien, a prevailing patentee in the ITC has a 100% chance of being awarded
a permanent injunction, compared to 79% in federal district court. Chien, supra note 64, at 99.
259. In re Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof, Products
Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Inv. No. 337TA-276, 1989 WL 608791 (Apr. 28, 1989).
260. Id.
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No explicit statutory basis exists for narrowing an exclusion order,
but the Federal Circuit has held that the agency “has broad discretion in
selecting the form, scope and extent of the remedy.”261 For example, the
ITC has exempted infringing products already on the market from an
exclusion order.262 In another investigation, the ITC issued a general
exclusion order for disposable cameras, but made an exemption for
importation for personal use, to prevent problems with Customs
enforcement.263
The ITC most commonly tailors an exclusion order by excluding
“downstream products”264 which incorporate the infringing product. To
make this determination, the agency uses the multi-factor EPROMs
balancing test, in which it considers issues including, but not limited to:
[(1)] the value of the infringing articles compared to the
value of the downstream products in which they are
incorporated, [(2)] the identity of the manufacturer of the
downstream products . . . , [(3)] the incremental value to
complainant of the exclusion of downstream products, [(4)]
the incremental detriment to respondents of such exclusion,
[(5)] the burdens imposed on third parties resulting from
exclusion of downstream products, [(6)] the availability of
alternative downstream products which do not contain the
infringing articles, [(7)] the likelihood that imported
downstream products actually contain the infringing
articles and are thereby subject to exclusion, [(8)] the
261. Viscofan, S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Note
that Commissioners Pearson and Pinkert disagree with the majority view that “‘the statutory
public interest factors do not really come into play in initially determining the scope of a remedy
in a section 337 investigation,’” In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and
Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including
Cellular Telephone Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *290
(June 19, 2007), rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Pearson, Chairman & Pinkert, Comm’r, dissenting) (quoting In
re Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof, Products Containing
Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Pub. 2196, Inv. No. 337TA-279 (Mar. 1989)). They instead find that “[t]he Commission has no authority to consider
alternative remedies to a broad exclusion order unless it has first determined that such an order
would not be in the public interest.” Id.
262. See Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *49.
263. In re Lens-Fitted Film Packages, USITC Pub. 3219, Inv. No. 337-TA-406, 1999 ITC
LEXIS 202, at * 25 (June 28, 1999).
264. “Downstream products” are products that incorporate the good that is at issue in the
ITC proceeding. See Powell, et al., Current Administration of U.S. Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Talks, 1 NW J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 177, 184 n.28 (1990). For example, a cellular telephone would be a downstream
product that incorporates a baseband processor chip. See Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC
LEXIS 621, at *5.
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opportunity for evasion of an exclusion order which does
not include downstream products, and [(9)] the
enforceability of an order by Customs.265
The ITC generally considers which party each factor favors and then
decides whether the downstream exclusion order should be granted.266
The ITC, however, consistently favors the patent holder in this
analysis. For example, it typically refuses to balance the financial
benefit to the complainant of excluding downstream products against
the harm to the respondent and the public.267 The ITC claims that such a
comparison would reintroduce the injury requirement that Congress
removed from § 337 in 1988.268
In calculating the costs and benefits of downstream exclusion,
moreover, the ITC acts under the belief that exclusion orders “spur
innovation.”269 Even if the patent holder will not directly benefit from
an exclusion of downstream products, the ITC assumes that the
complainant benefits by having its patents enforced.270 In Baseband
Processor Chips, for example, a downstream order was issued that
prohibited the sale of cellular phones that utilized an infringing chipset.
271
This order provided no direct financial benefit to Broadcom because
265. Notice of Vacatur of Comm’n Cease & Desist Order & Issuance of Modified Cease &
Desist Order, In re Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof,
Products Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories (EPROMs),
USITC Pub. 2196, Inv. No. 337-TA-276, 1989 WL 608791 (Apr. 28, 1989), aff’d sub nom.
Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“This list is not exclusive; the Commission may identify and take into account any other factors
which it believes bear on the question of whether to extend remedial exclusion to downstream
products, and if so to what specific products.”).
266. See, e.g., Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *52–209 (evaluating
each EPROMs factor and determining which party was favored).
267. See id. at *103.
268. Id.
269. Id. (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 476, 480 (1974)).
270. See id. at *103–07. Note, however, that the ITC will decline to issue a downstream
exclusion order absent sufficient evidence that downstream products contain the infringing
components. In re Voltage Regulators, Components Thereof and Products Containing Same,
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-564, 2007 ITC LEXIS 1108, at *110 (Oct. 19, 2007).
271. See Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *103 n.231 (“For these
reasons, we disagree with the analysis presented at the Commission Remedy Hearing by
Professor Hausman, who stated that the relief to Broadcom was zero. (‘A goose egg.
Zero. . . . We’re talking about billions of dollars lost to the public interest and zero gain
incrementally to Broadcom.’). . . . This analysis does not take into account the value of the right
to exclude granted by the patent right.” (quoting Hearing, Baseband Processor Chips
(testimony of Dr. Jerry A Hausman))); ALJ Order, Baseband Processor Chips, 2006 WL
3920334 (Oct. 10, 2006) (holding that the third EPROM factor weighs against Broadcom, and
stating that “the record reflects no substantive evidence that Broadcom’s sales will increase if
the downstream products are covered by the exclusion order”).
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it was not producing competing cellular phones and created a significant
public interest loss.272 The Commission nevertheless found that the
intrinsic value of exclusion weighed in favor of granting the
downstream order.273
Similarly, the ITC often justifies exclusion orders by relying on the
broad claim that “the public interest favors the protection of U.S.
intellectual property rights by excluding infringing imports.”274 The ITC
claims that denying an exclusion order would discourage investment in
technological innovation, hurting the marketplace.275
To support its conclusion that exclusion has intrinsic value, the ITC
in Baseband Processor Chips looked to case law and legislative history.
It cited a 1974 Supreme Court decision, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.,276 which noted that patent laws “‘promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts’ . . . by offering a right of exclusion for a
limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous
costs in terms of time, research, and development.”277 It also cited the
1987 Senate Report, which states that “[t]he importation of any
infringing merchandise derogates from the statutory right, diminishes
the value of the intellectual property, and thus indirectly harms the
public interest.”278
While patent enforcement likely does encourage innovation, the
overuse of injunctions can be harmful to the public welfare. For
example, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro describe how patent holders
can use the threat of an injunction to negotiate an artificially high
royalty from an infringer.279 They note that this threat can “discourage
272. Id.
273. Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 1108, at *103–04 (June 19, 2007).
274. In re Laser Bar Code Scanners and Scan Engines, Components Thereof and Products
Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-551, 2007 ITC LEXIS 623, at *34–35 (July 14,
2007) (citing In re Two-Handle Centerset Fausets and Escutcheons, and Components Thereof,
USITC Pub. 3332, Inv. No. 337-TA-422, 2000 WL 1159298 (June 19, 2000)); see also In re
Light-Emitting Diodes and Products Containing Same, USITC Pub. 3944, Inv. No. 337-TA512, 2007 ITC LEXIS 1454, at *38–39 (Aug. 2007) (“[C]ompetitive conditions favor protection
of intellectual property over inexpensive copies . . . .”); In re Power Supply Controllers and
Products Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-541, 2006 ITC LEXIS 600, at *14–15
(Aug. 29, 2006) (noting in its public interest evaluation that “protection of intellectual property
is favored”).
275. Voltage Regulators, 2007 ITC LEXIS 1108, at *102, *116–17.
276. 416 U.S. 476 (1974).
277. Id. at 480 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Baseband Processor Chips,
2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *103 n.231.
278. Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *103 n.231 (quoting S. REP. NO.
100-71, at 128–29 (1987)).
279. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1994–2010 (2007); see also John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies,
85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2148–49 (2007) (suggesting that courts apply a rebuttable presumption of
injunctive relief and either stay an injunction where appropriate or deny an injunction when it
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innovation by firms that design and manufacture complex
products . . . [and] can even lead to circumstances in which no one can
profitably produce a product with social value.”280
The ITC furthermore neglects the role of competition in promoting
innovation. According to the Supreme Court: “The Patent Clause itself
reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any
concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”281
As the FTC has observed, “[a] failure to strike the appropriate balance
between competition and patent law and policy can harm
innovation.”282 If the ITC wishes to promote innovation, it must
consider the positive and negative effects that exclusion will have on
competition, as § 337(d) mandates.
In awarding exclusion orders, the ITC must determine on a case-bycase basis whether the public will be harmed by the order. The agency’s
speculation regarding the broader effects of strong patent enforcement
should not override concrete evidence of harm. Even assuming there
exists a general public benefit from the enforcement of patent rights, it
does not follow that a specific exclusion order will promote the public
welfare and spur innovation.
The Federal Circuit has taken some action to reign in the ITC.
Sixteen third-party wireless companies affected by the downstream
exclusion order in Baseband Processor Chips joined Qualcomm in
appealing the decision to the Federal Circuit.283 Applying a Chevron
analysis to the ITC’s interpretation of § 337(d), the court held that the
agency exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a limited exclusion
order that blocked the imports of downstream manufacturers who were
not named as respondents in Broadcom’s initial complaint.284 The court
noted that under the provision’s plain language, limited exclusion orders
could only be applied to parties that the ITC found were violating
§ 337—i.e., only infringers that are named in the complaint.285 This
decision will make future ITC litigation more difficult, as patent holders
will have to sue more parties at the outset to obtain complete relief or
establish that a general exclusion order is appropriate.286
would inflict “undue hardship” on the infringer or implicate special concerns of the public
interest).
280. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 278, at 2010.
281. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
282. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
283. See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
284. Id. at 1358.
285. Id. at 1356.
286. See Bas de Blank and Bing Cheng, Where is the ITC Going After Kyocera?, 17–24, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2009), available at

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/3

44

Kumar: The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC

2009]

THE OTHER PATENT AGENCY

573

The ITC’s fundamental problems can only be fixed by Congress.
The ITC’s inadequate balancing of policy considerations illustrates how
Congress has failed to provide it with sufficient guidance. Section 337
provides little detail regarding when exclusion orders should be denied
and no guidance regarding when exclusion orders should be narrowed.
Without a clear statute, the ITC must speculate regarding how it can
promote innovation.
3. Incentive for Dual Litigation
The guarantee of injunctive relief from the ITC upon a finding of
infringement creates a strong incentive for patent holders to engage in
dual litigation. After eBay, numerous law firms issued client alerts
warning that litigants could no longer count on injunctive relief in
federal court and advising that patent holders consider ITC litigation.287
For example, the law firm Bingham McCutchen published an advisory
declaring:
In contrast to the uncertain availability of permanent
injunctions in district court, in Section 337 investigations
exclusion orders are and will continue to be the standard
remedy for a violation of the statute. This is likely to make
Section 337 an even more attractive alternative to district
court litigation, either by itself or in conjunction with a
parallel district court action.288
Although there has been only a small drop in the rate of injunctions
issued in federal court,289 the heavy promotion of the ITC has raised
awareness of the availability of dual litigation.

http://www.chtlj.org/symposiums/v25/papers; Michael J. Lyons and Andrew J. Wu, Exclusion
of Downstream Products After Kyocera: A Proposed New Framework for General Exclusion
Orders, 10–12, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2009), available
at http://www.chtlj.org/symposiums/v25/papers.
287. See, e.g., Eric J. Fues, Implications of eBay v. MercExchange, PATENT WORLD, June
2007, available at http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=14b0bd
e3-79ca-4182-be7d-ba92c1b795ab; Joseph R. Heffern & Jacob A. Gantz, Outbidding the
Supreme Court: The ITC as an Alternative Forum for Patent Infringement Injunctions PosteBay, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 23, 2007, at IP4, IP4, available at
http://www.dechert.com/library/Outbidding_the_Supreme_Court_04_07.pdf; Brian Busey &
John L. Kolakowski, ITC Section 337 Case Filings on Pace to Set Record, LEGAL UPDATES &
NEWS (Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P.), June 2006, www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update021
94.html.
288. A Record Number of Section 337 Cases Filed at the ITC, as The Supreme Court’s
eBay Decision Makes Section 337 an Even More Attractive Alternative Than Ever to District
Court Litigation, supra note 63, at 4.
289. See Chien, supra note 64, at 98–99.
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Further harm to innovation could arise if patent licensing
companies—better known as “patent trolls”—take advantage of dual
litigation. Due to the weakening of the domestic industry requirement,
patent holding companies are beginning to take advantage of the ITC.290
A company can thus meet the domestic industry requirement by
showing that it is exploiting the patent at issue (satisfying the technical
prong) and has made a substantial investment in licensing the patent
(satisfying the economic prong).291
For example, the patent licensing company St. Clair Intellectual
Property Consultants Inc.292 filed a series of patent-related actions
against Eastman Kodak Company in the ITC, California state court and
U.S. District Court in Delaware.293 St. Clair ultimately obtained a
settlement agreement.294 The eBay decision consequently gives patent
trolls a greater incentive to pursue parallel litigation, allowing them to
use the threat of an exclusion order as leverage for a settlement.
B. Reforming Exclusion Orders
Broad exclusion orders served a valuable purpose in 1974. At that
time, Congress needed to provide strong relief for foreign acts of unfair
competition to acquire protectionist support for a trade liberalization
bill. Congress gave newly-created ITC more power than its predecessor,
but left in place safeguards to ensure § 337 protected U.S. businesses.
Although the creation of the ITC paved the way for § 337 to be widely
used by patent holders, Congress does not appear to have realized this
consequence at the time.
Now, few, if any, non-IP cases are heard by the ITC under § 337. In
the 2006 fiscal year, for example, sixty-six of the seventy active
290. For example, the ITC investigation for Order No. 9, In re Point of Sale Terminals and
Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-524, 2004 WL 2341486 (Oct. 14, 2004)
involved an “Intellectual Property holding company” named Verve, which provides “intellectual
property-related consulting services, including patent portfolio assessment, patent donation and
acquisition, strategic licensing, pre-issuance patent assessment and litigation support.” The
company relied on licensing activities to fulfill the domestic industry requirement, but made
misleading statements, leading to sanctions. See Order No. 63, In re Point of Sale Terminals and
Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-524, 2007 WL 506522 (Feb. 6, 2007); Order
No. 16, In re Point of Sale Terminals and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-524,
2004 WL 2677985 (Nov. 17, 2004).
291. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2006).
292. Stuart Weinburg, After EBay Ruling, Patent Injunctions No Longer Automatic,
MARKETWATCH, June 1, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/m/story/4d1ce0e8-4cb5-4d35b3b8-abe1c9671f20/0.
293. See Order No. 7, In re Digital Cameras and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No.
337-TA-593, 2007 WL 1794141 (May 11, 2007).
294. Notice of Commission Determination Not to Review an Initial Determination
Terminating the Investigation on the Basis of a Settlement Agreement, In re Digital Cameras
and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-593, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1004 (June 9, 2008).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/3

46

Kumar: The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC

2009]

THE OTHER PATENT AGENCY

575

investigations had a patent infringement claim, and the remaining four
cases involved trademark or trade secret violations.295 Given this
backdrop, different standards for obtaining injunctive relief in federal
court and in the ITC are unwarranted.
The ITC claims that the differences are “reasonable in light of the
long-standing principle that importation is treated differently than
domestic activity.”296 But in practice, § 337 now functions as a
domestic patent enforcement provision. Consequently, the protectionist
principle that gave rise to § 337 is no longer relevant. Exclusion orders
harm U.S. companies as much as foreign ones, with domestic
respondents appearing in 87% of all ITC cases.297 Congress should
place safeguards on these powerful remedies or consider abolishing
§ 337.
1. eBay Should Not Apply to the ITC
One possibility that commentators have suggested is to amend
§ 337(d) to require application of the four-factor eBay test for ITC cases
that involve patent infringement.298 This change would mitigate the
strategic behavior of litigants, by limiting patent holders’ ability to get
exclusion orders in the ITC. However, the first two factors of the test,
which look at whether there is irreparable injury to the plaintiff and
whether monetary damages are available,299 should not be applied to the
ITC.
The first part of the eBay test requires the patent holder to show that
injunctive relief will cause irreparable injury.300 As discussed above, the
Trade Act of 1974 included a similar requirement, which required
patent holders to show that continued infringement would “destroy or
substantially injure” a domestic industry.301 The requirement was
considered to be easy to meet, with few parties denied relief solely on
that ground.302 Nevertheless, Congress removed the requirement in
1988, finding that it and other economic tests were not designed to deal
with infringing imports.303
295. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2006, supra note 10, at 14.
296. See In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio)
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone
Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *102 n230 (June 19, 2007),
rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
297. Chien, supra note 64, at 87–88. For ITC actions between 1995 and mid-2007, 14% of
all cases had only foreign respondents, 15% had only domestic respondents, and 72% had both a
foreign and domestic defendant. Id.
298. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 60, at 489.
299. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
300. Id.
301. See supra note 105.
302. See GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 28 (“Virtually all government and private sector
officials with whom we spoke commented that the injury requirement was extremely low.”).
303. S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 127–29 (1987).
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Adding an irreparable injury requirement is problematic if
Congress’s goal is to provide relief against infringers that operate
beyond the reach of U.S. federal courts. One in three ITC complainants
does not file parallel litigation in federal court.304 Such a patent holder
could be denied relief, despite being injured. This issue arises when
U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction over one or more of the infringers,
making the ITC the sole forum that can award relief. Moreover, from a
pragmatic standpoint, it seems unlikely that Congress will be willing to
reintroduce an injury requirement, given that patent interest groups are
opposed to such a change.
The second part of the eBay test requires the patent holder so show
that monetary damages or other remedies “available at law” are
insufficient compensation.305 It is not feasible for the ITC to apply this
test. To make such a determination, the ITC would first have to
determine whether personal jurisdiction would exist for all of the
respondents. This change would greatly increase the complexity and
length of ITC proceedings, and would force the agency to make
decisions outside its area of competence. The ITC would then need to
determine the proper amount of cash damages and determine whether
such an award is inadequate compensation. Patent holders could be left
without relief if the ITC denied an exclusion order and a court
subsequently concluded that cash damages were inappropriate.
2. Issuance and Scope of Exclusion Orders
Congress should amend § 337 to articulate explicit conditions where
an exclusion order may not be issued. The current language of the
provision is both broad and vague, stating that the ITC will grant an
exclusion order unless “it finds that such articles should not be excluded
from entry” because of mitigating public interest or economic factors.306
The ITC is never obligated to deny an exclusion order after finding
infringement. Because ITC remedies are subject to review only for
abuse of discretion, the Federal Circuit can do little to intervene.307
Congress should also clarify the effect of policy concerns on setting
the scope of exclusion orders. Section 337 is ambiguous regarding when
the ITC can narrow the scope of a limited exclusion order and which
factors it should take into account in doing so. The only formal tailoring
304. See Chien, supra note 64, at 92–93.
305. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
306. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006).
307. Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1207, 1209
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that remedy determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion and
noting that “‘the Commission has broad discretion in selecting the form, scope, and extent of the
remedy, and judicial review of its choice of remedy necessarily is limited’” (quoting Viscofan,
S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
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of limited exclusion orders requires the ITC to evaluate whether an
order should include downstream products under the EPROMs test. As
noted above, applying the EPROMs test is deferential to the patent
holder, weighing the supposed intrinsic value of strong patent protection
in favor of the complainant.308
To make these changes, Congress needs to focus on the third and
fourth factors in the eBay test. The ITC does not adequately balance
hardships between the parties nor does it require a finding that the
public interest will not be disserved before issuing injunctive relief. The
ITC claims that these factors are already taken into account under
§ 337(d),309 but in practice, such considerations have not prevented
issuance of an exclusion order in nearly twenty-five years.310 The
language in § 337(d) must be strengthened and clarified to be effective.
Congress should prohibit the ITC from issuing general, limited, or
downstream exclusion orders that would substantially harm
technological innovation, public health and welfare, competitive
economic conditions, or the production of competitive articles in the
U.S.
Congress should also prohibit issuance of general, limited, or
downstream exclusion orders when the economic benefit of the order
for the complainant is outweighed by the joint harm caused to the
respondents and to the public interest. Note that incorporating an
economic balancing factor is different from reintroducing the economic
harm requirement. The ITC would instead balance the harm to the
public interest and the respondents with the economic benefits to the
complainant. The patent holder would not have to show in the
complaint that economic harm exists. Instead, the respondents or the
staff attorney would have to establish that the harm outweighs the
economic benefit.
This change would prevent the ITC from issuing exclusion orders
where the patent holder does not derive a financial benefit. Currently, a
company can use a § 337 action as leverage for a cash settlement or to
hurt a competitor, even if the exclusion order is of no direct benefit to it.
Although this change will not prevent these types of actions from
initially being filed, it will prevent the issuance of harmful exclusion
orders.

308. See supra Part VI.A.2.
309. In re Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio)
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone
Handsets, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *102 n.230 (June 19, 2007),
rev’d in part sub nom., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2008), (“The remaining factors, those of balance of hardships and public interest, are
analyzed by the Commission in its EPROMs factors and public interest analysis.”).
310. See supra Part VI.A.1.
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With regard to downstream orders, these suggestions would augment
the EPROMs test. The ITC could continue to deny downstream orders
where the agency believes public policy weighs against it. The new
language would merely identify circumstances where the agency cannot
issue a downstream order.
If Congress makes these amendments to § 337, it would prevent the
ITC from issuing exclusion orders that substantially harm the public,
rather than making such decisions discretionary. It would also prevent
the ITC from using innovation to justify decisions that simply favor the
patent holder.
C. Promoting Uniform Innovation Policy
Ideally, Congress should develop a uniform approach to promoting
innovation through patent legislation. The ITC has shown that it is
unable to adequately address public policy concerns. And although the
Federal Circuit is in a position to do so, it has explicitly declined this
role, stating that such considerations should be dealt with by the
legislative branch.311
Congress took a first step when it passed the America COMPETES
Act in 2007.312 This legislation established a President’s Council on
Innovation and Competitiveness, to be staffed by the Secretary or heads
of departments for agencies involved with science and innovation.313
The purpose of the group was to develop an agenda which included
monitoring the implementation of public laws for promoting innovation,
including policies related to trade.314
But the America COMPETES Act has not been funded, calling into
question Congress’s commitment to advancing innovation. Beyond
funding, there is an issue of whether Congress has the institutional
capacity to address the problem. Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have
proposed bypassing Congress by creating an executive branch
innovation agency that can analyze pending agency actions and suggest
regulatory reform.315 As the authors acknowledge, however, such an
agency would be unable to address problems caused by the statutes that
Congress enacts.

311. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
312. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology,
Education, and Science Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572 (2007).
313. See DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMERICA COMPETES ACT:
PROGRAMS, FUNDING, AND SELECTED ISSUES 45 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rp
ts/RL34328_20080122.pdf.
314. 15 U.S.C. § 3718(b)(1) (2007).
315. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 1.
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Given the immense challenges of crafting uniform innovation
policy, Congress should consider addressing the immediate problems of
uniformity in the patent system by abolishing § 337. Such a move
would likely garner international support, but would be fiercely opposed
by the U.S. pro-patent lobby.316 Nevertheless, this approach would be
the most efficient way to address the wide array of problems that have
arisen from patent litigation in the ITC.
Section 337 hinders innovation by failing to adequately balance the
needs of patent holders with those of competitors and the public. It
promotes excessive litigation, incoherent patent jurisprudence, and
strategic behavior by litigants. It furthermore does not adequately
protect domestic industry. While one can argue that the provision
promotes domestic interests by limiting the import of foreign goods,
nevertheless, U.S. companies are frequently named as respondents.
Indeed, the traditional supporters of protectionism showed little
enthusiasm for the changes made to the statute in 1988.317
The biggest and most unique advantage of § 337 litigation—
exclusion orders—could be brought in under the Patent Act, subject to
the balancing requirements in eBay. Although exclusion orders would
become available to all U.S. patent holders, regardless of the existence
of a domestic industry, the application of the eBay test should limit their
use. Congress could furthermore grant district courts the ability to use in
rem jurisdiction for the limited purpose of issuing exclusion orders
targeting parties that cannot be brought into federal court.
This approach would eliminate the availability of fast, streamlined
litigation. However, speed alone does not justify a two-track patent
system. Rather, this problem highlights the shortcomings of the patent
litigation system in its entirety, which should be addressed as a whole.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ITC’s broad patent enforcement and policymaking powers
under § 337 pose a threat to the efficacy of the patent system.
Ambiguity surrounding the applicability of the Patent Act—coupled
with the ITC’s lack of preclusive effect on district courts—jeopardizes
the uniformity of the patent system. Patent holders frequently engage in
parallel litigation and strategic behavior to maximize the value of their
patents, placing a burden on respondents who are forced to defend
themselves twice. This scenario, in turn, leads to inconsistent judgments
316. The lack of feasibility for this solution has been pointed out by at least one scholar.
See Michael D. Rostoker, Impairing U.S. Trade through U.S. Trade Law, 34 IDEA 169, 182
(1994).
317. 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 52, 59 (statement of Rudy Oswald, Director,
Economic Research Department, AFL-CIO); id. at 329 (statement of John M. Greer, Vice
President, Graphic Communications International Union).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

51

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3

580

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

between the ITC and district courts, undermining the credibility of the
agency.
Moreover, the current provision forces the ITC to make
determinations of patent policy without guidance. The ITC’s
policymaking expertise lies in trade, not in promoting the progress of
the useful arts. Yet the agency has broad discretion to remedy patent
infringement through exclusion orders, leading to decisions—such as
Certain Baseband Processors318—that hurt innovation. These problems
will worsen as the ITC’s docket grows, making it crucial that Congress
harmonize federal and ITC patent law.
These issues highlight a bigger problem regarding Congress’s
regulation of the patent system. The ITC, PTO, and federal courts all
have the power to interpret patents, and both the ITC and the courts
have the power to enforce them. Yet Congress treats the ITC as an
afterthought in the patent system, and not as a powerful agency whose
actions have far-reaching effects. Congress needs to take a
comprehensive approach to promoting innovation. Neglecting any one
of the above entities—as Congress has repeatedly done—will lead to
strategic behavior by patent holders and ultimately will hinder the
technological progress that society depends on.
If Congress cannot undertake this reform, then it should abolish
§ 337. Congress could then amend the Patent Act to add exclusion
orders as a remedy. Although such a change would make exclusion
orders available to foreign patent holders with no domestic presence,
district courts would be limited by eBay. The ITC would no longer be
forced to speculate on how to promote the goals of the patent system,
and could instead return to its intended purpose of protecting U.S.
companies.

318. See Part VI.A.
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